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ABSTRACT 
The United States was attacked by terrorists in 2001, and the country entered into 
a highly publicized debate on how to keep the country safe. Immigration reform to 
counter the ability of terrorists to circumvent U.S. immigration laws became the focus of 
much anti-terrorism legislation. Many immigration laws, especially concerning the 
deportability of an individual, which had been in place since the mid-1990s, were 
expanded and additional enforcement mechanisms created. However, policies emplaced 
have created new challenges with cooperation with Latin America due to the 
overwhelming impact the laws have had on Latin Americans, whether documented or 
undocumented. Additionally, the laws are written and passed due to the political pressure 
resulting from acts of terrorism, but there are significant provisions that can be applied to 
countering criminal activity. The broad approach has sent contradictory messages to 
Latin America in comparison to U.S. plans for economic integration. The impact on 
cooperation from Latin America is just one way the overall strategic goals of the United 
States have been affected by deportation policy. As the United States seeks faster 
mechanisms to emplace borders and return non-citizens, Latin America must reintegrate 
them into a society that is improperly prepared to deal with them. This strategy may serve 
the short-term goals of the United States if it was effectively implemented, but the sheer 
amounts of undocumented immigrants in this country do not make that possible. 
Additionally, deportation policy has not addressed the long-term goals of U.S. security 
strategy to promote freedom and economic opportunity to counter terrorism and crime.  
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I. INTRODUCTION  
Government investigations in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks revealed 
that a number of the attackers had entered the country legally and subsequently violated 
immigration policies. After discovering that at least a few 9/11 terrorist overstayed their 
visas due to the inability or unwillingness to enforce existing policies, immigration policy 
become intensely scrutinized. Immigration policy after 9/11 became a vital component of 
National Security Strategy, and immigration services were reorganized under the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS). This reorganization increased resources and 
put more emphasis on security than on the previous principles of immigration policy. The 
creation of the DHS subordinated deportation policy to the homeland security goals of 
policing the homeland rather than policing the workforce or serving the needs of the 
immigrant community.  
Seven years later, deportations were again making headline news though for 
different reasons. One the one hand, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has 
carried out a series of highly publicized raids of workplaces since 2006. On the other 
hand, the federal government has targeted members of “violent transnational street 
gangs” for deportation. In addition, the media has begun to highlight crimes committed 
by illegal aliens whom local and state governments have failed to deport when they had 
the chance, putting pressure on these governments to change their policies and enforce 
federal laws.1 In many ways, this shift in immigration policy from a counterterrorism 
focus to fighting crime and monitoring the workplace reflects a return to the original 
motives for the initiation of a strict deportation policy in the 1990s.  More importantly, 
the shifting priorities raise important questions about what factors have shaped the 
making of deportation policy over time, how this policy has actually been implemented, 
and what the consequences has been for national security.  Has the United States 
government enacted deportation policies that have successfully targeted terrorists or has 
legislation merely allowed for the broader application of counterterrorism mechanisms to 
                                                 
1 Jaxon Van Derbeken, “S.F. Mayor Shifts Policy on Illegal Offenders,” San Francisco Chronicle, 
July 3, 2008, http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2008/07/03/MNU911IPGK.DTL. 
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expand into criminal investigations?  Does the enforcement of deportation policy 
contribute to national security objectives by ridding the country of terrorists and criminals 
or has it undermined these objectives by creating transnational criminal networks of 
deported gang members and reducing the ability and willingness of Latin American 
countries to cooperate with the United States in combating transnational threats? 
A. RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND ARGUMENTS 
It is my hypothesis that deportations are not an effective counterterrorism 
strategy. The events of 9/11 led to changes in deportation policy but not the kind 
expected from a counterterror justification. The disproportionate concern with the 
southern border puts Latin America on the front lines of U.S. homeland defense despite 
the lack of ties to terrorist organizations. Instead the driving force behind immigration 
policies relating to Latin America is deterring illegal activity rather than counterterrorism.  
The preliminary questions this thesis seeks to address are: 
 How have deportations served the national security goals of the United 
States? Are these goals truly related to terrorism or are they more 
concerned with fighting crime?  
 Do deportations prevent crime or do they waste resources and manpower 
with the increased criteria that makes an individual deportable? Are 
priorities misplaced when determining who is to be deported? 
 Is the strategy of the United States strengthening relations with Latin 
America or increasing ideological differences in the region? Is Latin 
America the next terrorist hot spot? 
Latin American nations have no known ties with terrorist organizations, with the 
possible exception of the Tri-Border area and financing, and there is also no known 
evidence that support a link between terrorist cells with transnational gangs. However, 
restricting immigration and increasing deportations not only provides a false sense of 
security to U.S. citizens, but also fails to truly combat illegal activity.  
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While deportations of criminals allow for the United States to provide for the 
security of its citizens in the short run, they may also unwittingly increase this threat by 
contributing to the spread of transnational gangs based in the United States and Central 
America. A recent CRS report notes that gang violence has become a serious problem for 
the United States as well as Latin American nations. The method of deterring criminal 
gang activity has been associated with enforcing immigration laws and increasing 
deportation of gang members. This has brought on additional scrutiny as U.S. gang 
culture has been exported back to Latin America and has enabled gangs to establish 
transnational organizations that operate freely across borders. Congressional leaders have 
feared that this ease in movement would be ideal for terrorist networks to infiltrate, but 
currently there is no evidence to support such ideas. Policy goals of the administration 
would not be served properly if the DHS uses threats of terrorism to shape law 
enforcement, and if criminals are returned to their countries without their governments 
knowing their U.S. crimes. In addition to this unintended consequence, U.S. deportation 
policy may also make Latin American governments less willing and able to cooperate in 
combating transnational threats.  These arguments and competing claims will be 
evaluated against the existing empirical evidence in order to assess the impact of 
deportation policy on U.S. security goals.2  
Deportations are an important issue for national security for not only the United 
States, but also Latin America. The implications of deportations on Latin American 
countries effects regional cooperation and has unintended consequences which strain 
relations. Central American nations blame the increased organization and sophistication 
of transnational gangs on the deportation of their citizens from the United States. With 
failed U.S. policies focused on an unfounded correlation between terrorism and the 
undocumented, Latin American nations are disproportionately targeted for deportation 
since three-quarters are from Latin America.3  As importantly, it is important to 
                                                 
2 Celinda Franco, “MS-13 and 18th Street Gangs: Emerging Transnational Gang Threats,” CRS Report 
for Congress (November 2, 2007): 2.   
3 Donald Kerwin and Margaret D. Stock, “National Security and Immigration Policy: Reclaiming 
Terms, Measuring Success and Setting Priorities,” U.S. Military Academy’s Combating Terrorism 
Research Center, July 2006: 41.  
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understand if changes in deportation policies serve counterterrorism goals. This question 
is significant since it increases resources spent on enforcing immigration policies that are 
not directly contributing to counterterrorism efforts as well as contributing to an 
unintended consequence of increasing the efficiency of transnational crime organizations.  
The security of the United States depends on developing clear strategies focused 
on clear objectives. In order to provide adequate solutions for the security requirements 
of the United States, an honest assessment is necessary. In many cases, objectives do not 
match the reality of the problem. These efforts inhibit policy-makers judgment, strain 
relations with Latin American nations and present contradictory policies to the 
international community and to U.S. citizens. Misconceptions and the need to justify all 
actions as relating to terrorist threats relegate decision makers to making similar mistakes 
from the Cold War era. 
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The majority of the literature on the impact of 9/11 on immigration is focused on 
the constitutionality of deportation policy and its impact on human rights rather than its 
impact on national security. For example, Tumlin argues that placing immigration 
services under the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) altered the manner in which 
all immigrants are treated and is contrary to the Constitution and the legal rights afforded 
to immigrants regardless of their status. Instead of making immigration services more 
efficient, DHS is focused on protecting the American way of life from terrorism: this will 
always lead to a focus on enforcement over services.4 Tumlin shows that new 
immigration policies, based on counterterrorism measures, allowed for increased 
deportation of all groups of immigrants. Similarly, Walker argues that linking 




                                                 
4 Karen C. Tumlin, “Suspect First: How Terrorism Policy is Reshaping Immigration Policy,” 
California Law Review 92, no.4 (July 2004): 1179.  
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government to act in accordance with the Constitution and adequately target terrorist 
threats. This thought process allows for the increase in deportations and establish a 
parallel between crime and terrorism.5  
Despite the abundance of studies of deportation policy from a legal perspective, 
there are no systematic studies of how deportation policy and its enforcement have 
evolved over time, nor the policies behind this. There are snapshots of key changes made 
in 1996 and post 9/11 and some studies of the enforcement action of federal, state and 
local governments but little overall sense of the factors driving the formulation and 
implementation of policy. This is the case even though there have been significant 
changes in legislation. The public reaction after the implementation of the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the first World Trade Center bombing 
moved Congress to act. They presented two acts focusing on criminals that were illegal 
immigrants: the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) and the Illegal 
Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996.6 
The implementation of the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing 
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA 
PATRIOT Act) allowed for the broader use of counterterrorism strategies to be used for 
general law enforcement. There are no restrictions on the types of crimes that can be 
investigated utilizing the tools authorized by the PATRIOT Act and law enforcement has 
been able to legally justify investigations on money laundering, drug offenses, espionage 
as well as suspected terrorist cells. The Department of Justice declared that law 
enforcement’s greater surveillance power is not a misuse of authority. The unintended 
consequence or benefit of the PATRIOT Act’s execution does not make the act 
unconstitutional. Opponents of the PATRIOT Act criticize the government for using 
terrorism as a justification to change law enforcement methods indefinitely.7 
                                                 
5 Clive Walker, “Keeping Control of Terrorists Without Losing Control of Constitutionalism,” 
Stanford Law Review 59, no.5 (March 2007): 1396.   
6 Nancy Morawetz, “Understanding the Impact of the 1996 Deportation Laws and the Limited Scope 
of Proposed Reforms,” Harvard Law Review, 113, no.8 (June 2000): 1936.   
7 Eric Lichtblau, “U.S. Uses Terror Law to Pursue Crimes from Selling Drugs to Swindling,” New 
York Times, September 28, 2003, sec.1, 1. 
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In addition to changes in national policy, there also appears to have been a series 
of changes in the way state and local law enforcement implement this policy. Until the 
1980s, state and local law enforcement enforced federal immigration law on the borders 
as well as in the interior of the United States in a manner that allowed them to question an 
immigrant’s status based on reasonable suspicion during the course of normal policy 
work. However, as political opposition to the Reagan administration’s activities in 
Central America grew in the 1980s, churches across the country declared themselves as 
safe havens or sanctuaries for those fleeing political violence and civil war in Latin 
America. As Latin American communities grew, state and local law enforcement had to 
choose between enforcing federal immigration law and alienating crime victims and 
witnesses whose cooperation was necessary for law enforcement. States like Oregon, 
Alaska and Maine and cities such as San Francisco, Houston, New York, Chicago, Los 
Angeles, San Diego and Austin established “sanctuary” policies that do not require the 
police to inquire about a person’s citizenship status. Other communities have taken even 
more drastic measures by forbidding state and local law enforcement officers from 
voluntarily communicating with federal immigration officials despite a Congressional 
ban on such measures.8 These policies have come under criticism recently as more media 
attention has highlighted vicious crimes committed by illegal immigrants. Of the 12 
million estimated illegal immigrants in the United States in 1999, 300,000 were 
determined to be criminals with an additional 400,000 leaving the country to avoid 
prosecution.9 
In 2006, Boatright conducted a study analyzing how the character of federal, state 
and local law enforcement changed after 9/11. He provided both arguments for and 
against federal level mandates that state and local law enforcement must have an 
increased role in immigration enforcement in order to provide additional counterterrorism 
support. He concluded that the federal government requires state and local law 
enforcement to be successful in policing the homeland, but that priorities of these 
                                                 
8 Morawetz, 1645.  
9 Peter H. Schuck and John Williams, “Removing Criminal Aliens: The Pitfalls and Promises of 
Federalism,” Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy, 22(2) (Spring 1999): 380.   
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agencies may not be consistent with federal policies and mandates causing a fracture and 
lack of communication.10 Arguments for increased use of state and local law enforcement 
assert that they provide 95% of counterterrorism capability in the United States and better 
training and federal funding can also assist in ordinary crime fighting especially in 
challenging the rising violence from street gangs such as MS-13.11 It appears that state 
and local law enforcement will be the ones to make a choice about tradeoffs since the 
nature of the U.S. constitution allows them to defy federal law without much retribution 
from the federal government.  
There are some studies discussing the effect of deportation on homeland security 
and national security objectives, but the debate tends to be a polarized one that relies on 
very limited evidence. The most comprehensive study, by Kerwin and Stock, outlines 
how immigration policy must be fully integrated in a national security strategy while 
acknowledging that the economic prosperity of the nation is dependent on accessibility 
by foreigners.12 The most significant measure is the PATRIOT Act in 2001. This Act 
allowed for the detention of non-citizens before charges are filed and increased the 
security-related reasons for denying admission and deporting non-citizens.13 Kerwin and 
Stock note that deportation is not an effective immigration policy or counterterrorism 
policy for several reasons. The first reason is that releasing suspected terrorists to their 
home nation does not stop future attacks nor does it allow for the U.S. government to 
monitor their actions. Second, deportations are appealing due to resource constraints and 
not necessarily due to their effectiveness. For example, deportations are ideal when 
resources and interrogation assets are limited.14  When these resources are not limited, it 
would be preferable to question detainees in order to secure intelligence on actual 
security threats. 
                                                 
10 Laurel R. Boatright, “Clear Eye for the State Guy: Clarifying Authority and Trusting Federalism to 
Increase Nonfederal Assistance with Immigration Enforcement,” Texas Law Review 84, no.6 (May 2006): 
1633.   
11 Boatright, 1647.  
12 Kerwin and Stock, 1.  
13 Kerwin and Stock, 4.  
14 Kerwin and Stock, 15.  
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Finally, while much has been written about how 9/11 and the subsequent U.S. 
focus on counterterrorism has contributed to the deterioration of U.S.-Latin America 
relations, there has been surprisingly little focus on how deportation policies have 
affected our relations with our southern neighbors and whether they have undermined the 
U.S. pursuit of national security objectives that require multi-national support. The 
available evidence, however, suggest this is an important issue. For example, a USAID 
report analyzes gang activity in five countries: El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, 
Mexico and Nicaragua. All five countries have limited gang prevention and rehabilitation 
programs and there is limited communication between U.S. and Latin American officials 
concerning when gang members are deported. Without a successful means to share 
records on violent criminals, Latin American governments have limited ability to provide 
any remedial services nor are they fully aware of the crimes their citizens committed in 
the United States. The addition of the U.S. gang culture in Latin America is not the only 
reason for an elevation in gangs in Latin American, but it is a significant contributing 
one.15 
C. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis will use the case study methodology and cover the time period from 
1994 through the present to compare changes in deportation policies pre and post 9/11, 
how they have been enforced, and their consequences for national security. Examining 
the changes in immigration policy and enforcement mechanisms emplaced after 
September 11, 2001 requires an understanding of the policies and politics of immigration 
legislation that was in place before the attacks. Therefore, Chapter II is focused on 
outlining the policies emplaced after 1994 and the driving factors behind those policies 
and enforcement strategies, especially deportation. The chapter first outlines the major 
Acts and initiatives from 1994-2001and the extent to which their provisions were actually 
enforced.  It then analyzes the key factors driving the policy changes and assesses their 
effectiveness in meeting their stated goals.  It finds that the acts designed to protect the 
United States from terrorism and crime committed by undocumented immigrants failed to 
                                                 
15 U.S. Agency for International Development, Central American and Mexican Gang Assessment  
(April 1, 2006): 6.  
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solve the problems of illegal immigration or protect the United States from subsequent 
terrorist acts.  Chapter III addresses the same issues for the post–September 11, 2001, 
period and finds that the root causes of illegal immigration were still not addressed and 
efforts to decrease illegal migration and deter terrorism and crime through the use of 
physical barriers and increased immigration personnel only showed the mismanagement 
of resources. The fourth chapter is an overview on how Latin America fits into the 
national security objectives of the United States and joint initiatives that serve those 
goals. It focuses on the impact of increased deportations on the terror and crime threat 
emanating from the region and U.S. relations with Latin America. In conclusion, Chapter 
V assesses the effectiveness of deportation as a tool of national security. 
The primary sources for the thesis include empirical data relating to deportations 
and criminal incidents taken from the Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse 
(TRAC) Immigration Project and the Homeland Defense Digital Library. Other sources 
used in this thesis include U.S. congressional testimony, U.S. Congressional Research 
Service (CRS) reports, articles from legal reviews and other periodicals, U.S. government 
and non-government reports, books and journal articles pertaining to national security, 
immigration policy and economic policy.  
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II. DEPORTATION POLICY PRE–9/11 
Immigration policy debates are not a result of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, but are a 
long-standing issue that has existed since our nation’s conception. Policies concerning 
who should be allowed to enter and remain in the United States have changed through 
time as economic conditions in our nation and internationally have changed. National 
security concerns, sometimes unfounded, have guided policymakers especially during 
times of national emergencies, whether those emergencies are of an economic or security 
nature.  
Harsher deportation laws were initiated after political pressure following acts of 
terrorism committed in the 1990s. Even those these acts were committed by foreigners 
and U.S. citizens, the popular target was the immigrant community. Capitalizing on the 
public need for an increased perception of safety, politicians turned to targeting the 
immigrant community. Deporting illegal aliens, especially those that had committed 
crimes, was seen as a very popular way to reduce the overall perception of crime and 
provide a sense of security, even if the sense of security was misguided. These laws were 
not effective in curbing illegal immigration or acts of terrorism since they did not focus 
on the underlying reasons for illegal immigration nor did they target legitimate terrorist 
organizations. 
A. THE ANTITERRORISM AND EFFECTIVE DEATH PENALTY ACT OF 
1996 (AEDPA) 
Senator Robert J. Dole introduced the AEDPA to Congress with eight co-sponsors 
in 1995 after versions of the bill sat in committee for a decade until political pressure 
gave it new purpose. It received increased support after the 1993 World Trade Center and 
Oklahoma City bombings in the early 1990s despite only immigrant involvement in the 
World Trade Center attacks. The Act provided new guidelines on whether or not state 
and federal prisoners, who are immigrants, may appeal to the federal judiciary to review 
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their cases with respect to the U.S. Constitution.16 The narrowing of the writ of habeas 
corpus had consequences for the deportability of immigrants by denying them the right to 
a judicial review. Title IV (Terrorist and Criminal Alien Removal and Exclusion), 
addressed immigration issues and points directly to a link with terrorism. As a result, it 
narrowed asylum provisions, seen as a means to thwart deportation, and reduced the 
evidentiary requirement for law enforcement to demonstrate that an immigrant is a 
danger to society. The Act cited that those eligible for deportation had used procedural 
provisions to remain in the United States.  The ability of terrorists to stay in the United 
States by using asylum provisions was determined to be a threat to national security and a 
waste of manpower and resources due to the administrative costs of the applications.17 
The Act also challenged previous procedural requirements and allowed for the use of 
classified information in establishing deportability.  
The AEDPA also contained special procedures for the deportation of foreign 
terrorists and upon initial review did not appear to cross constitutional grounds. For 
example, Section 401 authorized the Chief Justice to “name five district court judges to 
serve five year terms as judges of a special removal court, 8 U.S.C 1532. The removal 
procedure is initiated by an application from the Attorney General indicating that an 
identified alien is a terrorist.”18  The judges would then examine the evidence and the 
alleged terrorist would have the ability to have counsel and present evidence. Evidence 
presented by the Department of Justice would have to show beyond a preponderance of 
evidence that the person is a terrorist. Classified information is also summarized and 
presented to the alleged terrorist without compromising national security or informants. 
The most controversial part of this section is a clause allowing the Attorney General to 
detain the individual at the onset of the removal process. Those that are found entering 
the United States after being deported or denied entry under Section 401 are also subject 
to ten years in prison. 
                                                 
16 Charles Doyle, “Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996: A Summary,” American 
Law Division (June 3, 1996): 4.   
17 Doyle, 4.  
18 Doyle, 6.  
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Subtitle B (Exclusion of Members and Representatives of Terrorist 
Organizations) established that association with terrorist organizations is justification for 
denying entry to the United States and also limited the discretionary ability of the 
Attorney General to withhold, suspend, permit voluntary deportation, and adjust status of 
an immigrant.  Instead, the Attorney General is required by law to remove any immigrant 
that entered the United States illegally unless they can provide evidence that they entered 
in accordance with the law. Subtitle C (Modification to Asylum Procedures) allowed for 
immigration officers to make determinations as to the merits of asylum for those seeking 
entry to the United States at an individual’s point of entry. It also put the burden of 
determining whether or not any alien terrorist is worthy of asylum directly on the 
Attorney General. The Attorney General must make the determination weighing the 
merits of asylum against national security. This provision also limits judicial review in 
Section 423 of the decisions made at the point of entry to those circumstances where an 
individual claims U.S. citizenship or has been admitted for permanent residence.19  
The Criminal Alien Procedural Improvements provision outlined in Subtitle D 
permits the disclosure of confidential information concerning status and agricultural 
worker status through court order if related to a criminal investigation or if an immigrant 
has been killed or seriously injured. The provision also required the implementation of a 
criminal alien tracking station and identification system to assist in identifying and 
locating those that are deportable due to criminal acts. Also included in the provision was 
the addition of immigration offenses to the list of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
Organization (RICO) provisions established in the 1960s. The additions to RICO include 
crimes involving fraud in obtaining passports, visas and other entry documents as well as 
human trafficking and providing safe haven and aid for illegal aliens. Under Section 435, 
courts can issue wiretapping orders for the use in immigration investigations. RICO 
convictions hold a sentence of up to 20 years.20  
Subtitle D also provided additional description on crimes of moral turpitude. The 
definition provided clarification that an immigrant was deportable if the crime they 
                                                 
19 Doyle, 21. 
20 Doyle, 21.  
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committed was able to be punishable for up to one year in prison and not if they had 
actually received a one year prison sentence. Under Section 438, deportation is permitted 
before immigrants are convicted of nonviolent crimes (excluding drug trafficking) serve 
their complete sentences. Aliens that were repeatedly reentering the United States were 
required to serve their entire terms in addition to any new sentences. Local and state law 
enforcement can also detain those reentering the United States illegally. Furthermore, in 
Section 440, the crimes that call for immediate deportation of criminal aliens are 
increased. Aggravated felonies, drug violations, espionage and weapons laws all are 
included in crimes that call for expedited removal and under such circumstances there is 
no judicial review after the Board of Immigration Appeals and the Attorney General has 
no discretion to act. Despite mandating additional responsibilities and the implementation 
of systems and tracking mechanisms, Congress provided the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS) with only $5 million per year through FY97-FY00 for these 
added responsibilities and systems.21  
B. THE ILLEGAL IMMIGRANT REFORM AND IMMIGRANT 
RESPONSIBILITY ACT (IIRIRA) 
The IIRIRA signed into law in 1996 was a combination of two bills concerning 
legal and illegal immigration separately. It is divided into six sections and concentrated 
on a variety of issues from border control, penalties on smuggling and document fraud to 
detention and deportation of aliens. Additionally, the Act restricted the benefits for illegal 
and lawful immigrant residents of the United States pertaining to social services and 
government programs. The most criticized aspects of the law are the lack of mechanisms 
to balance the social harms caused by the deportation of individuals for relatively minor 
crimes.22 
The first section, Title I (Improved Border and Interior Enforcement) increased 
the total number of Border Patrol agents by 5,000 over a five-year period. This section 
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also provided $12 million for a fourteen-mile fencing project in the San Diego area and 
new equipment for the INS (rotary and fixed-wing aircraft, night vision capabilities and 
four-wheeled vehicles) to assist in their enforcement duties. All those apprehended 
attempting unlawful border crossings could be fined $250; high-speed evasion could 
result in up to five years in prison. Title I also included provisions that mandate the 
Attorney General develop an automated entry-exist system for the borders in addition to 
initiating pre-inspection areas in at least five foreign airports that send large amounts of 
ineligible persons to the United States.23  Title I also charged the INS with investigating 
unlawful employment and visa overstays. It was mandated that each state have a 
minimum of ten INS investigators within one year and state officials were permitted to 
carry out federal investigations, apprehensions and the detention of illegal immigrants as 
long as they were trained in federal laws.24 
Title II of the IIRIRA added human smuggling and document fraud to the 
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) list, increased the penalties 
for RICO crimes involving immigration offenses and increased by 25 the number of 
Assistant U.S. Attorneys participating in investigations of these crimes. RICO now 
included provisions that included violations of the Immigration and Nationality Act 
(INA) that would be considered as racketeering. This means that those who 
systematically engage in racketeering for profit can be held liable in the criminal and civil 
courts.25 
The deportation system was reworked in Title III of the IIRIRA. Title III imposed 
a three-year and ten-year ban on reentry for illegal immigrants caught in the United 
States. For example, an individual who overstays their visa for 180 days but less than a 
year cannot be readmitted for three years. If an individual stays for longer than one year 
unlawfully, they are barred for ten years. Notable exceptions to these bans including 
minors, asylum applicants and family unity petitioners. The provision includes 
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exemptions for abused women and children and spouses of U.S. citizens if separation 
would cause undue hardship on the family. Individual rulings can be appealed, but the 
rules themselves cannot be appealed. 
Title III also allows for more discretionary ability at the individual INS officer 
level with no judiciary oversight. INS officials can make determinations on 
inadmissibility at point of entry or for those who cannot prove that they were in the 
United States prior to the Act for two years. The only recourse is for those seeking  
asylum; a separate officer, who determines whether they possess a “credible fear of 
persecution,” screens them. Even if they do not believe the asylum case is warranted, 
judicial review is required.26    
“Deportation” procedures were also semantically changed to “removal” 
proceedings. Aliens who had been in the United States for seven years with no criminal 
history and had ties to U.S. residents were no longer allowed to apply for relief or 
“suspension of deportation” allowing them to remain in the United States and change 
their residency to that of permanent resident. Congress replaced this relief with a 
“cancellation of deportation” provision, but it distinguishes between green card holders 
and nonimmigrant aliens. Nonimmigrant aliens are considered temporary residents such 
as students, tourists, foreign diplomats, trainees and temporary workers. Green card 
holders are eligible if they held it for five years, resided in the United States for seven and 
never been convicted of a felony.”27 Cancellation for nonimmigrant aliens is more 
difficult to obtain since they are required to prove they have been in the United States for 
10 years with no convictions of serious crimes, show good morale character, and that 
their removal would result in hardship to a U.S. citizen. “Voluntary departure” is also 
included in Title III that allows those who voluntarily leave the United States to avoid the 
reentry bars. They must meet certain requirements as well including: presence in the 
United States for over one year, good moral character for at least five years, not 
deportable on criminal grounds, and intends to leave the United States and has the 
capacity to do so.  
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Deportation procedural changes were also affected by the addition of new crimes 
that result in the deportability of an immigrant. Deportability was increased by the 
reduction in the amount of fines and length of sentence required to consider an immigrant 
deportable. Title IV required aliens currently in the probation system to register with the 
INS and mandated the tracking of illegal or deportable immigrants in the prison system. 
The Attorney General was required to provide statistics on the type of crime committed 
and incarceration rates to Congress on a regular basis. Added to the IIRIRA were 
additional exclusion categories: anyone thought to have participated in terrorist activities, 
domestic abuse stalking, as well as falsely claiming U.S. citizenship were all now 
determined to be non-admittable to the United States.  
The IIRIRA also included new provisions intended to make it more difficult to 
obtain asylum in the United States. Applicants cannot be convicted criminals and may not 
have already been denied asylum unless under special circumstances. These restrictions 
were also coupled with duties on asylum case officers that mandated that hearings occur 
within 45 days of application with a decision determination within six months. 
Applicants must also provide positive identification in the form of fingerprints or 
comparable evidence and pay an application fee. Applicants who are found to provide 
false information will be permanently barred from U.S. citizenship. Humanitarian parole 
was also changed and now is determined only on a case-by-case basis. In order to 
accommodate the new restrictions, the number of funded asylum officers increased by 
600.28   
Student Visas, a major contributor to visa overstay violations, were also affected 
by the IIRIRA. Students are inadmissible if they plan to attend public elementary or non-
college level adult programs. Additionally, students must plan on paying the school for 
attendance. Entrance is permitted for those seeking to attend private schools, but if they 
change their school to a public one, they are removable unless they reimburse the school 
district and meet the twelve-month limit. University students are required to provide 
additional information that will be compiled electronically. The Visa Waiver program for 
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those countries contributing to the lowest levels of visa violators and illegal immigrants 
was extended under this provision. Countries who contribute to 3.5% of the illegal 
immigrant population will have their Visa Waiver privileges automatically terminated.  
Additionally, Congress enacted other initiatives that limited benefits for 
immigrants and created an atmosphere of fear, confusion and distrust in the government. 
The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act (PRWORA) of 1996 restricted 
the welfare benefits of immigrants, legal and illegal, in order to provide disincentives for 
illegal immigration. The PRWORA set limitations for states on groups of immigrants, 
including those that had previously been eligible for benefits. The Act redefined, under 
Title IV, who was eligible for benefits and put a new requirement on social service 
officials to understand how public benefits relate to immigration law, a difficult endeavor 
as the changes are not universal across all benefits.29 The changes outlined in the federal 
Act also had enormous implications at the state level and many states challenged the 
federal mandate that they deny benefits for immigrants. Their main point of issue is that 
since the federal government establishes overall immigration policy and that mandating 
the states implement their own immigration policy will result in a “cost transfer” to the 
states and then to individual communities to enforce these policies.30  
In addition, the law has been criticized for its potential public health 
consequences.  Non-citizens, regardless of legal status may have false impressions of the 
policy. They may not seek medical attention for fear of deportation or losing their 
chances at permanent citizenship for utilizing social services even though that is not 
stated within the Act. The aversion to seeking care can potentially damage not only their 
own health, but also those they come into contact with. Failure to seek medical treatment 
for communicable diseases can result in epidemics and additional strain on the health 
care system. In large immigrant communities the effects of the PRWORA can be 
exponentially evident. 
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C. ENFORCEMENT 
Federal policies put a tremendous burden on the law enforcement community to 
comply with Congressional mandates. These Acts also created the need for 
appropriations and additional enforcement capabilities at the federal level. In addition, 
the legislature may make mandates upon the states, but laws are meaningless without an 
enforcement mechanism. Enforcement of immigration laws have varied from 
implementing entry and exit tracking programs, increased border patrol and INS agents, 
increases in detention beds and tracking deportable criminals in the prison system. While 
databases and tracking mechanisms are essential in managing deportable aliens, it is also 
necessary to identify those residing illegally outside of the criminal justice system. 
Attempting to identify and remove non-criminal immigrants is difficult and puts the 
burden on state and local level law enforcement agents to understand and have the 
capacity to physically enforce those policies.  
The AEDPA and the IIRIRA were designed to provide state and local police with 
the ability to arrest illegal aliens who were present in the United States unlawfully and 
who had previously committed a felony within the United States. These laws also 
required that state and local law enforcement work with federal agencies. 
Implementation, however, met with resistance at the state and local level and there is not 
one uniform standard maintained across the states. Each state has been able to interpret 
the Acts individually and develop law enforcement practices that best serve the needs of 
their individual communities.  
1. Federal Initiatives 
Before 2001, there were fewer than 2,000 INS agents enforcing federal policies. 
The priority for the INS prior to 9/11 was to investigate “aliens committing crimes 
including fraud, smuggling and trafficking of aliens, and work site violations.”31 The 
1996 Acts required the INS to complete deportation proceedings on criminal aliens in 
prison as a means to rid the prison system of undocumented immigrants. The provisions 
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were designed to keep criminal aliens; especially those who had committed aggravated 
felonies, from returning to the United States. The Acts also provided for additional border  
patrol agents and increased patrolling along the borders.  As a result, between 1996 and 
1998, deportations increased from 80,000 to 180,000. These numbers reflect both legal 
and illegal immigrant statistics.32  
The INS’s ability to track and issue deportation orders was important in reducing 
the strain on detention facilities. However, statistics demonstrated that the INS was slow 
to establish automated tracking mechanisms for managing potentially deportable inmates 
and had no record on 27% of potentially deportable criminals as required by statute. The 
agency’s inability to issue deportation orders before release cost the INS an estimated 
$40 million dollars in detention costs.33 The ability to identify potentially deportable 
criminals in prison is only one aspect of the enforcement provisions started in the 1990s. 
Federal initiatives designed to assist in enforcing the Acts included the establishment of 
Quick Response Teams, a physical barrier along the border, and the Absconder 
Apprehension Initiative designed to locate and deport those who have failed to show for 
their removal proceedings. In 1999, the Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency 
Supplemental Appropriations Act provided for the INS to create Quick Response Teams 
(QRTs) designed to apprehend and deport illegal aliens. The QRTs coordinate with state 
and local law enforcement agencies in areas with increased illegal immigrant activities.34 
One of the most significant features of the IIRIRA is the written order by 
Congress to the Attorney General to construct physical barriers in “the vicinity of the 
United States borders” in order to prevent access in high risk areas.35 High-risk areas 
have not been expressly determined nor has the term “the vicinity of the United States 
borders” been defined.  
                                                 
32 Pia Orrenius, “U.S. Immigration and Economic Growth, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas,” 
Southwest Economy 6 (November/December 2003). 
http://www.dallasfed.org/research/swe/2003/swe0306a.html. 
33 Norman J. Rabkin, “INS’ Efforts to Identify and Remove Imprisoned Aliens Continue to Need 
Improvement,” United States General Accounting Office (February 25, 1999): 2.  
34 Seghetti, 2004, 3.  
35 Blas Nuñez-Neto and Yule Kim, “Border Security: Barriers Along the U.S. International Border,” 
CRS Report for Congress (May 13, 2008): 5.  
 21
Enforcement of immigration law in the workplace increased significantly in 1997 
but soon tapered off as pressure from lobby groups in the agriculture sector and 
bureaucratic red tape that hinders prosecuting employers decreased the attractiveness of 
worksite enforcement as a tactic to deter illegal immigration. In 1997, 7,537 worksite 
inspections were conducted, but the apprehensions only represented a fraction of 
undocumented immigrants.36 By 2002, worksite enforcements had dropped to just over 
2,000.37 Instead, the INS developed and tried to streamline strategies that focused more 
on those immigrants that provided a danger to communities and not those acting in 
relationship to global economic forces in addition to building physical barriers. The U.S. 
economic market requires certain levels of unskilled labor, which immigrant populations 
provide, and therefore enforcement met resistance from agricultural interests. However, 
studies have shown that this is not quite the case as the areas that require unskilled labor 
have higher rates of unemployment than any other group.38 
2. State and Local Initiatives 
The IIRIRA provided law enforcement personnel the ability to intervene in civil 
immigration laws in two situations. First, if the presence of a “mass influx” of foreign 
nationals requires an immediate action, law enforcement personnel may react after 
gaining permission from their corresponding supervisors. Second, the Attorney General 
may delegate immigration authority to state and locals if those agencies received prior 
training and received a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). However, no state or 
local law enforcement agency completed the training or received an MOU prior to 2001. 
Additionally, while the IIRIRA lifted a ban on public employees disclosure of individual 
immigration status to the INS, it did not empower employees to investigate status. 
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Local law enforcement agencies were changing their practices at the same time 
the new immigration laws were being developed in Congress. Law enforcement agencies 
around the nation were changing methods and incorporating a “community policing” 
effort that made them reluctant to enforce new federal immigration statutes. 
Neighborhood watch groups and civic organizations were extremely effective in assisting 
local law enforcement agencies especially in minority areas. From 1993 to 2000, the 
Latino community reduced their non-fatal violent crime rate by 56%. The positive results 
of “community policing” efforts provided the data needed to ignore federal regulations in 
favor of methods that reduced crime in their own localities. In fact, some communities 
banned local law enforcement agencies from enforcing immigration status and 
questioning the citizenship of witnesses and suspects. Communities also countered 
welfare reform by instructing those working in social agencies to continue to provide 
social services for illegal immigrants by not asking for their immigration status. The 
Supreme Court has not challenged the plenary power of Congress over immigration, 
although it could bring up several questions under the equal protection clause.39 
A lack of integration between the INS and local law enforcement has at times 
undermined law enforcement efforts. In 1999, an illegal Mexican immigrant named 
Rafael Resendez-Ramirez turned himself in to the Texas Rangers. He had been wanted 
for at least eight murders in Illinois, Kentucky and Texas. Resendez-Ramirez had also 
been deported three times for unrelated crimes and voluntarily returned to Mexico nine 
times despite his “wanted” status. In another instance, local law enforcement officials in 
the District of Colombia could not resolve 24 murder cases because the suspects fled to 
El Salvador before they could be apprehended. If the INS and local law enforcement 
personnel were more integrated, the INS may have been able to apprehend the suspects 
before they fled the country. While many studies suggest that immigrants commit crime 
at the same rates or lower as non-immigrants, there are important factors to consider that 
suggest that immigrant crime is higher due to the lower levels of reporting by their 
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communities.40 INS data did establish lower rates of recurrent criminal behavior among 
non-deported immigrant criminals, 37% compared to 66% of native born, from October 
1994- May 1999, but this was still seen as an inability to safeguard the population from 
criminal aliens during congressional debates.41  
States are required to pay for the associated costs of putting criminal aliens 
through the legal system, but the federal government has offered some assistance 
financially. States, especially those along the border, have developed programs that were 
designed to deter illegal immigration through cooperative efforts with the federal 
government. These systems include increased deportations, border control, and 
monitoring criminal aliens. Additionally, states have integrated with the federal 
government deportation screening proceedings through the Institutional Hearing Program 
(IHP). The IHP allowed the states and the INS a new means of collaborating for the early 
deportation within the state prison system. Some states, such as Florida and New York, 
offer clemency to those non-violent offenders in exchange for early deportation.42 
D. ANALYSIS OF POLICY CHANGES 
This section describes the main political factors that motivated the passage in 
1996 of the IIRIRA and the AEDPA.  Rising crime and the economic downturn in the 
mid-1990s were causing hardships on all levels of government. Immigrants were 
becoming a likely target for the nation’s problems, but it was not until the terrorist attacks 
on the World Trade Center and in Oklahoma City that Congress moved to support the 
IIRIRA and the AEDPA. Even though the Oklahoma City bombing was an act of 
domestic terrorism, it did not stop the Acts from first targeting foreign terrorists and 
immigrants in general. The section also shows that these legislative attempts to 
strengthen national security through immigration fell short because of the lack of 
understanding the underlying reasons for illegal immigration and addressing it 
appropriately.  
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1.  Driving Factors 
The IIRIRA was a follow up to the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) 
of 1986. The IRCA was in response to the failing state of the Mexican economy 
contributing to higher levels of illegal immigration to the United States. It increased 
funding for the INS and border control and established the agriculture guest worker visa, 
the H-2A. Additionally, it offered amnesty to approximately three million illegal 
immigrants, the majority from Mexico.43 The IRCA also provided for employer 
sanctions, but these were not enforced.  Instead of enforcing current policy or adapting it 
to focus on the reasons for illegal immigration, the IIRIRA and AEDPA were a stricter 
repackaging of already enacted legislation. 
The IIRIRA and the AEDPA attempted to redefine and provide stronger 
legislative support for the provisions of the IRCA, but neither was successful in 
countering illegal hiring practices. The IRCA left a loophole through the use of 
subcontractors that the IIRIRA did not close. The agricultural sector successfully won the 
battle against worksite enforcement becoming a central pillar in internal illegal 
immigration enforcement. The IRCA also provided amnesty for millions. The amnesty 
also increased illegal immigration as family members and other immigrants came to the 
United States in hopes of another amnesty offer.44 The IIRIRA and AEDPA sought to 
counter the influx by denying social benefits to illegal immigrants and making it more 
difficult for legal residents to be eligible for services. It also failed to address the claims 
that the IRCA led to discriminatory hiring practices based on ethnicity.   
The recession of the early 1990s resulted in rising unemployment and as a result, 
immigrant workers were often victims of crime and anti-immigrant legislation. At the 
federal level, the Republican-dominated Congress introduced the early forms of the 
IIRIRA and the AEDPA that contained provisions that would deny children of 
undocumented immigrants access to public schools, deport legal immigrants who used 
public assistance for over 12 months and restrict access to federally funded AIDS 
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treatment programs to immigrants. These provisions were cut under pressure from those 
states with high immigrant communities in addition to threats of a presidential veto. 
However, the bill was seen, even by Democrats, as a measure to show effectiveness at 
border control.45 While these provisions are primarily concerned with the economic 
strain on supporting immigrants, the bills also had an anti-crime focus that gave the bills 
more bipartisan support. The Clinton administration cited a need for immigration reform 
after years of no serious legislation backed by enforcement and promised to deport those 
who had committed a crime.46   
The bill was passed as more of an anti-crime bill although the language 
specifically referenced terrorism, a direct result of the political pressure to show a tougher 
stance on terrorism after the 1993 World Trade Center and the 1996 Oklahoma City 
bombings. After the World Trade Center bombing, the flaws in the immigration system 
seemed even more pronounced after it was discovered that Mahmud and Mohammed 
Abouhalima entered on tourist visas and were later granted amnesty in 1986 by claiming 
to be agricultural workers. Both were convicted of involvement in the first World Trade 
Center bombings. Most notably, Sheik Rahman entered under a tourist visa and lied to 
receive permanent residency. When his residency was revoked due to his 
misrepresentation, he applied for asylum to prevent deportation. Since his asylum request 
was pending, he was able to remain in the country and to plan the first World Trade 
Center bombing as well as unsuccessful plans to destroy New York City landmarks.47  
Despite this, there was still not enough support in Congress for the immigration laws to 
be passed; it would take the worsening crime and economic situation and the Oklahoma 
City bombing three years after the World Trade Center attack, to generate support in 
Congress. Although the IIRIRA was modified from its original form to  
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be less damaging to immigrants, it still was thought to be the harshest bill up to that time 
on the immigrant community since it directly related to the access to the writ of habeas 
corpus and access to appeals.  
At the state level, similar Acts were being introduced. California Propositions 187 
and 227 were passed in 1994 and 1998 respectively. Proposition 187 sought to exclude 
the children of undocumented immigrants from public schools and state benefit 
programs.48 Proposition 227 was a campaign against bilingual education in public 
schools. A subsequent Supreme Court ruling based on three separate cases, Lau v. 
Nichols, Castañeda v. Pickard and Phyler v. Doe, stated that no school can deny the right 
to public education based on national origin, schools must provide tools to learn 
academic English, and that no one can be restricted from access to schools based on 
immigration status.49  The implementation of NAFTA and economic recovery in the 
latter part of the 1990s reduced the overall animosity between citizens and non-citizens 
regarding the economy, but interest groups gained powerful momentum during this time. 
Interest groups assert that access to social services of undocumented immigrants drains 
U.S. economic resources and will increase illegal immigration to have access to U.S. 
programs. However, there is no evidence that immigrants come to the United States for 
the purpose of using social services. 
The IIRIRA and the AEDPA were also in response to the growing perception that 
immigrant crime was rising and straining the U.S. legal system. A restrictive approach to 
immigration gained more popularity in the 1990s as the economy worsened and the 
media provided information that made citizens fear a change in the culture of the United 
States by the growing number of immigrants from Latin America. Ironically, the 
implementation of NAFTA in 1994 integrated the United States with Mexico while the 
subsequent 1996 laws sought to provide more barriers. The removal of legal protections 
for Mexican farmers under provisions of NAFTA contributed to the arrival of more 
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agricultural workers to the United States.50 As cheap labor flooded the U.S. market and 
the U.S. economy entered into a downturn, the likely target of U.S. citizens was the 
immigrant community. Seen as a way to protect jobs of their constituents, many 
representatives were elected on anti-immigrant or restrictive platforms. At this time, there 
was also an increase in immigrants from Cuba and Haiti and the media capitalized on a 
sense of invasion of foreigners.  
Although the IIRIRA and the AEDPA were originally drafted with an anti-crime 
and economic undertone, the terrorist attacks gave the bill a new purpose and increased 
the overall level of support for the provisions despite previous objections. Prior to the 
terror attacks, most opposition to the bills was from representatives from states with high 
levels of immigrants. Restricting access to services and easing deportation criteria caused 
hardship and frustration for their constituents and their families. Additionally, the bill had 
even harsher provisions concerning immigrants.  
2.  Consequences 
The IIRIRA and the AEDPA were designed to offer protections against terrorism 
and crime. The immigration system was the delivery method for these provisions through 
the increase in penalties for immigration violations and streamlined deportations of 
immigrants suspected of supporting terrorism and those who had committed crimes. Both 
aspects, terrorism and crime prevention, resulted in moderate success, but they also raised 
new legal questions and whether or not the Acts specifically address what they were 
written to do or if they were too broad and unfocused.  
For example, in order to combat terrorism and crime, increased patrolling and 
barriers were funded at the border. After the 1996 Acts, border agents were hired at an all 
time high. The total number of border patrol agents increased by 42% from 1997 until 
2001.51 However, there is no correlation between increased border patrol agents and 
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increased apprehensions at the border, despite logic suggesting that more resources and 
manpower should increase overall levels of enforcement.52 Additionally, the incidents of 
crossing deaths has increased each year as barrier projects force more illegal crossings to 
remote areas and increase the susceptibility of migrants to traffickers. From 1998 to 
2004, there was a 29% increase in border deaths while the number of apprehensions was 
also reduced.53 No evidence exists to show that terrorists have been able to cross through 
the southern border with Mexico, but fences were authorized. The levels of total illegal 
immigrants have not been affected by the increase in agents or barriers.  
 Another major point of the IIRIRA is expanded deportation criteria, an increase 
in penalties for immigration violations and bars of entrance for those who have violated 
immigration laws. One of the flaws of the system was presented in the Supreme Court 
case, Zadvydas v. Davis in June of 2001. The problem concerned the deportation of an 
individual whose home country would not accept the return. The court declared that once 
deportation was not an option, the individual could not be indefinitely detained unless the 
individual poses a substantive security risk. The court’s ruling resulted in the release of 
over 3,000 illegal immigrants mostly from Cuba and Southeast Asia.54 This ruling will 
play an important part in the detention of individuals suspected of terrorism after the 
2001 terrorist attacks. The laws did streamline the deportation process and reduced 
constitutional protections afforded to all immigrants suspected of supporting terrorism.  
The Acts addressed only a few of the ways in which terrorists have been able to 
exploit U.S. immigration policy. The Center for Immigration Studies examined how 
known terrorists gained entry to the United States from 1993-2001. The study provided 
evidence that terrorists abused the temporary immigration provisions by overstaying their 
visas, but not all violated their visa terms before committing terrorist acts within the 
United States. The statistics suggest that terrorism is not solely associated with temporary 
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immigrants and therefore a more encompassing policy should be enacted.55 The 1996 
laws did not address this issue effectively since there were no mechanisms put into place 
that effectively could track violators nor was research conducted to examine the best way 
to counter this problem.   
A new visa system that would be tamper proof was mandated.  Better screening of 
applicants for citizenship may help identify possible candidates for deportation instead of 
citizenship and the Acts did recognize the benefit of pre-screening. However, the U.S. 
government is not immune from corruption. A Visa adjudicator in Mexico was sentenced 
to eighteen months in prison for selling U.S. Visas.56 Although this act has not been 
associated with allowing terrorists to enter the country, it does show that the U.S. 
immigration system is still vulnerable to corruption and can be manipulated by criminals 
and terrorists. 
Terrorists have not only been able to take advantage of temporary immigration 
policies, but also of the systems that allow for naturalization and permanent residencies. 
None of the 9/11 terrorists were permanent legal residents of the United States; however, 
prior to 9/11, more than half of the terrorist attacks on U.S. soil were committed by 
permanent residents or naturalized citizens.57 Avenues to exploit the programs allowing 
for naturalization and long-term residencies include humanitarian based approaches. 
Refugees, those living outside their country and applying for admittance in foreign 
countries, have their applications reviewed by the State Department before they enter the 
United States. Asylum applications are filled out by those who are currently within the 
United States, although both groups are supposed to be held to the same standards. 
Reports show that approximately 75,000-100,000 refugees have been admitted to the 
United States while only 10,000-15,000 applicants have been awarded asylum.58 
However, terrorists have been able to use the asylum process to delay their deportation, 
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without having any legal basis to ask for asylum. The IIRIRA changed the asylum 
procedures and restricted applications in order to solve this problem and reduce the 
number of fraudulent claims. The number of asylum applications drastically decreased 
following the 1996 Acts.59 
The IIRIRA and the AEDPA also had anti-crime provisions that led to increased 
prosecutions and deportations. Although the provisions may have provided some 
protections from terrorist activity, they were mainly concerned with targeting criminals. 
The challenge has been to balance public safety, national security and individual rights. 
As the federal government placed mandates on states through legislation, the states were 
able to pick and choose which provisions they wanted to establish based on public 
sentiment and the needs of local law enforcement. Sanctuary cities became common 
during the Reagan administration as a means to counter the effects of foreign policy in 
Central America. The civil wars in Central America led to an increase in illegal 
immigrants from Latin America escaping violence and the absorbing communities felt 
that deporting immigrants could result in their torture or death. The sentiment of 
protectionism against deportations during these early years had consequences for 
communities after the 1996 Acts increased their vulnerability to deportation.  
The ability of individual cities to circumvent federal law decreases the 
effectiveness of the statutes laid out by the government. It also sent a message that local 
law enforcement authorities are not allowed to cooperate with federal immigration 
agents, establishing an atmosphere of distrust and non-cooperation between agencies. The 
lack of interagency cooperation and involvement reduced each sector’s ability to combat 
crime and terrorism. For example, despite funding for additional training to state and 
local law enforcement officials by federal immigration authorities under the 287(g) 
program, not a single training agreement was signed until 2002.  
The 1996 laws were written in order to prevent terrorism although most of the 
enforcement mechanisms authorized dealt more with the criminal aspect of violating 
immigration laws. The laws have had moderate success and have been met with 
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resistance from immigrant rights groups. The laws have given rise to more questions over 
the constitutionality and fairness of the laws.  A substantial benefit of the Acts came from 
easier deportation of criminal aliens and increased staffing levels for immigration agents. 
A more pro-active approach to preventing terrorism would have been to address the 
barriers in intelligence and information between agencies. This was later addressed by the 
PATRIOT Act. The 1996 Acts focused more on borders and crime while neglecting the 
challenges faced in the interior of the country in regards to terrorism and access for local 
law enforcement to intelligence. Additionally, they have served as a starting point for 
successive and more restrictive immigration and counterterror policy due to their inability 
to prevent the September 11, 2001 attacks.  
The ability of terrorists to enter and remain in the country highlighted the flaws in 
the country’s enforcement of existing policies and contributed to the largest terrorist 
attack in U.S. history. The events of 9/11 demonstrated the numerous gaps in 
immigration policy and enforcement and shocked the government into making 
considerable changes. The establishment of the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS), the reorganization of the INS under the DHS, and new legislation were all put 
forth to counter terrorism and increase security within the United States. Similar to the 
motivations behind the IIRIRA and the AEDPA, government restructuring and additional 
legislation seeks to provide additional security from terrorism, but also encompasses anti-
crime measures that suggest a more “all hazard” approach to establishing national 
security. 
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III. DEPORTATION POLICY POST 9/11 
The terrorist attacks of 9/11 revealed the significant policy and structural issues 
that existed within the U.S. federal government. In response, Congress and the president 
enacted several orders and Acts designed to respond to the increased threat from terrorist 
organizations. Immigration policy was a natural target since the terrorists who conducted 
the 9/11 hijackings were all foreigners who gained lawful entry or who had violated 
immigration laws, thus highlighting the failure of the INS to enforce federal law. Four 
Acts implemented post 9/11 specifically addressed immigration policy and directly 
related national security to the deportation of illegal immigrants. They include: The USA 
PATRIOT Act, the Homeland Security Act of 2002, the Enhanced Border Security and 
Visa Reform Act, the Secure Border Initiative and the REAL ID Act. These Acts have 
raised considerable questions in regards to constitutionalism and the rights of non-
citizens and permanent residents.  
The events of 9/11 provided additional fuel for anti-immigrant sentiment within 
the United States. The policies of the IIRIRA and AEDPA in the 1990s set the stage for 
increasing the enforcement of immigration violations and provided mechanisms already 
in place to target immigrants. The increased public awareness of terrorist threats and 
organized criminal activity perpetuated by immigrant groups contributed to increased 
legislation. Actions such as the PATRIOT Act, the 287(g) and the establishment of the 
Department of Homeland Security, provided similar capabilities as the IIRIRA and the 
AEDPA, but created a new framework for enforcing the same ideas. All branches of 
government were eager to implement new safety measures in the wake of 9/11. The 
speed with which organizations were reorganized and created new legislative measures 
were enacted was unprecedented. However, the Acts signed into law after 9/11, were 
fairly consistent with immigration policy that pre-dated the terrorist attacks. The new 
Acts expanded federal government capabilities, but the ideas behind those policies were 
prevalent in the AEDPA and the IIRIRA as well as the IRCA. This chapter provides a 
brief description of the acts and highlights how these Acts are predicated on the belief 
that increased deportation capability will lead to increased national security.  It also 
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analyzes the extent to which there have been changes in the enforcement of immigration 
policy since 9/11, showing that illegal immigration has not decreased due to new 
legislation, increased barriers and deportation. It concludes by analyzing the 
consequences of these changes on the immigrant community and in public perception.    
A. USA PATRIOT ACT 
One of the most scrutinized and heated debates concerns the legislation that 
directly brought immigration and national security to a critical juncture. The United and 
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and 
Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT Act) was signed into law on October 
26, 2001. The legislation that established that aiding terrorist organizations was a crime 
was already implemented by the AEDPA in 1996; the PATRIOT Act established tougher 
penalties and increased the scope of the previous Act.60 The USA PATRIOT Act was a 
direct response to the terrorist attacks and the lack of coordination between the layers of 
government in intelligence and enforcement. The implementation of the PATRIOT Act 
allowed for broader use of counter-terror strategies to be used for general law 
enforcement. There are no restrictions on the types of crimes that can be investigated 
utilizing the tools authorized by the USA PATRIOT Act and law enforcement agencies 
have been able to legally justify their investigations on money laundering, drug trade, 
espionage in addition to suspected terrorists. The Department of Justice (DOJ) declared it 
within the rights of the Act despite the unintended benefits or consequences of its 
execution. Opponents of the Act criticize the government for using terrorism as a 
justification to change law enforcement methods applying to different crimes.61 
The PATRIOT Act in general allows that “any information lawfully gathered 
during a foreign or domestic counterintelligence investigation or during a domestic law 
enforcement investigation should be able to be shared with other federal agencies.”62 The 
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same tools that the PATRIOT Act authorizes have been used to investigate and convict 
drug dealers and those involved in organized crime. The expansion allows for the tools to 
be used by counterterrorism investigators in an expedited manner. The tools include 
wiretapping, delayed notification search warrants, and updated surveillance laws to 
include new technologies including the Internet. If a wiretap is requested, the 
requirements outlined by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) of 1978 still 
must be met. Investigators must provide a sworn affidavit that they believe an individual 
is an agent of a foreign power or terrorist organization. Delayed notification search 
warrants have previously been used by the Drug Enforcement Administration for 
protecting long-term investigation while simultaneously gathering evidence and keeping 
drugs from the retail market. It allows for law enforcement to conduct searches without 
having the requirement to inform the criminals about it until later. The Supreme Court in 
1979 found that the delayed notification search was consistent with the Fourth 
Amendment.63 In 1967 the Supreme Court established that the Fourth Amendment only 
protects “only those things in which someone has a reasonable expectation of privacy.” 
Anything exposed to the public does not require any form of court authorization.64 
The PATRIOT Act also updated legislation to address the Internet age. 
Additionally, it allows for the government to subpoena library records. Similar to 
searching the Internet for information on how to conduct crime, order chemicals or build 
bombs, library records are fair game in establishing intent to commit crime. Other 
technological resources that the PATRIOT Act included were the monitoring of 
international students, in particular their travel in and out of the United States. 
Immigration officials are also able to use the tools authorized under the PATRIOT Act to 
investigate illegal financial activity.65  
One of the most significant changes concerns the breakdown of the wall that 
existed between intelligence and law enforcement and allows for the necessary 
cooperation between the two agencies. Law enforcement agencies can share information 
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and have access to new tools, including the use of DNA of foreign nationals, to assist in 
criminal investigations, under the PATRIOT Act. While the original purpose of the Act 
was in countering terrorism, there are multiple benefits when combating not only 
terrorism, but also criminal organizations comprised of foreign actors. One success story 
is Operation Hamlet, where Immigration and Custom Enforcement (ICE) officials 
uncovered an international child molestation ring. The PATRIOT Act allowed for the 
quick issue of subpoenas to Internet service providers and 100 child victims were rescued 
in the process.66  
Deportations and detentions are expressly cited in the PATRIOT Act as a tool for 
national security in Sections 411 and 412. The PATRIOT Act states that aliens are 
deportable from the United States if they were inadmissible at the time of entry or have 
subsequently engaged in terrorist activities. It also adds terror related grounds for denial 
of admission to the United States and redefines previous terror-related categories and 
adds three more to the list making individuals inadmissible or deportable.67 It redefined 
the actions of engaging in terrorist activity as well as representing a terrorist organization 
to include the solicitation of funds or gathering information for terrorist organizations. It 
also makes members of political organizations who support terrorists inadmissible for 
entry as well as those who use their position to challenge U.S. counter-terror policy. 
Section 412 allows for the Attorney General to detain terrorist suspects for up to seven 
days with reasonable suspicion. After the seven days, the Attorney General must 
initiative removal or criminal proceedings or releases the individual. If the suspect is 
held, their case must be reexamined every six months. The President’s Military Order of 
November 13, 2001 also gave the Secretary of Defense the authority to detain alien 
terrorist suspects within the United States or abroad under his powers from the 
Authorization for Use of Military Force Joint Resolution (Public Law 107-40, 115 
Section 224) and Sections 821 and 826 of Title 10 of U.S. Code.68  
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Critics argue, however, that the PATRIOT Act expanded the definition of terrorist 
activity too much. Terrorist activity, under the Act, can be simple association with 
organizations that share similar ideologies. They argue that this overly broad definition 
brings the failed “guilt by association” model back into immigration law. An individual 
would be deportable even if they indirectly supported a terrorist association in some 
manner regardless of whether or not the organization had committed any act of terrorism. 
The concerns are directly linked to the First Amendment.   
B. THE HOMELAND SECURITY ACT OF 2002 
The broadest measure after the terrorist attacks taken by the federal government 
was the implementation of the Homeland Security Act in 2002. This Act dissolved the 
INS and placed immigration services under the newly created Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS). The government created three organizations within the DHS to respond 
to immigration requirements. The United States Bureau of Customs and Border 
Protection (USBCBP) provides customs inspections and ensures only authorized 
personnel and goods enter into the United States. They also manage student visas through 
a computerized system. The State Department’s Bureau of Consular Affairs issues visas 
in overseas consulates, but the DHS issues and enforces the regulations of who is eligible 
for a visa. The U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (USICE) is responsible for 
enforcing immigration laws, investigating, detaining and deporting illegal aliens. The 
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) formed to facilitate applications. 
The immigration organizations under the new DHS acknowledged a transition 
period, but assured that there would be a substantial reduction in backlogs for those 
waiting processing with the addition of new resources, which included upgraded 
computers, additional personnel and access to new information systems. The Bush 
Administration authorized $480 million for an entry-exist system that included biometrics 
with an additional $500 million to reduce the backlog of applications. The USCIS 
expected to be able to complete over seven million applications, 70,000 asylum cases and 
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100,000 interviews of refugees.69 The addition of automated resources gave the 
organization an expectation of being able to assist millions of customers through 
telephone and local offices.  
Also within the DHS, the USICE goal is to enforce immigration and customs 
laws. It is responsible for securing the borders by maintaining the economic and 
transportation infrastructure. ICE is also an investigating agency focusing on human 
rights violations, arms smuggling, cyber and financial crimes and export enforcement 
issues. The FY 2006 mission statement of ICE, “protect America and uphold public 
safety by targeting the people, money and materials that support terrorist and criminal 
activities” is essential in understanding the ideological shift in ICE.70 On top of the 
previously listed important areas of investigation, ICE has refocused their mission 
statement to reflect the threat of terrorism and the need to combat it through immigration 
services.  
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 did more than restructure the INS and create 
a new bureaucracy; it also directly impacted the system of how deportations are handled 
and what agencies have responsibilities for their management and withdrawal 
adjudication. The Attorney General retained authority for determining whether or not an 
alien was deportable, but the DHS conducts all administrative functions. The 
administrative functions shifted from the INS to the DHS’ Under Secretary of Border and 
Transportation Security.71 The move in immigration laws and enforcement under the 
DHS also corresponds with the DHS’s new ability to detain any alien upon determination 
of their status.  
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C. THE ENHANCED BORDER SECURITY AND VISA REFORM ACT 
The Enhanced Border Security Act and Visa Reform Act, approved on May 14, 
2002, directly laid out a plan for immigration agencies. The major points of the Act 
included a requirement for agencies to share information and to utilize technological 
resources. It provides millions of dollars for funding for technological improvements in 
addition to increased training and pay increases for employees. The use of technology 
and increased capability and cross sharing between agencies is important in enforcing 
federal law, but these benefits do result in criticism specifically from the use of enhanced 
technology to track individuals.  
Sections 101 and 102 noted the importance of trained personnel and required 
additional training for consular, diplomatic security, and immigration personnel as well 
as increases in annual pay for border control and INS inspectors who complete a 
minimum of one year of service. The Act also appropriates $150 million dollars for 
technological improvements that make commerce more efficient and expedient at the 
borders through the use of preclearance and pre-enrollment programs. In Section 201, the 
Act also obligated consulates to forward electronically visa files to immigration officials 
at all U.S. entry points. The section also includes a reporting requirement concerning the 
inadmissible or deportability criteria determined by the State Department and the INS. 
The Act also had provisions to protect against abuses of information gained through its 
provisions and established harsh criminal penalties for those found guilty. The Act in 
Sections 202, and 203 mandated that internal INS databases be linked to allow for easier 
searches on individuals and for federal law enforcement officials to share information 
with the INS and State Department. It also created a commission to provide oversight to 
prevent abuses of new technological features. The development of and implementation of 
the “Chimera System” was contained in Section 204.72 The electronic system would be 
interoperable between agencies. 
                                                 




The Act also restricted entry into the United States for individuals from countries 
with terrorist ties. It required that by October 2004, entry and exit documents must be 
tamper resistant, machine-readable and contain both fingerprints and photographs. 
Additionally, an integrated entry and exit data system was mandated in Section 302. This 
was first required by the IIRIRA in 1996, but not enacted. The president is also required 
to provide a study on the viability of a North American Security Program between the 
United States, Canada and Mexico. In Section 402, the Act required that all carriers 
provide data on their passengers and forward that information using the Advanced 
Passenger Information System (APIS).73 The purpose of APIS is to identify passengers 
and crewmembers that are potential risks to U.S. national security while still allowing for 
legitimate travel. The APIS data is checked against Interagency Border Inspection 
System (IBIS) used by federal law enforcement. Fines for carriers found in 
noncompliance were also raised from $300 to $1000.74  
The Act also amended the IIRIRA by increasing the monitoring provisions of 
student visas. The student visa program not only includes the electronic monitoring of 
students attending universities and colleges, but also language training, flight schools and 
other vocational type training facilities. Schools are also required to inform the INS if a 
student has not attended school for more than 30 days after class registration. Students 
must also provide additional personal information concerning their residence, family 
members, degree program and employers. No student will be issued a visa if they have 
failed to provide the required information and is reviewed and forwarded to the academic 
facility provided on their application. Academic institutions are also reviewed and 
authorizations to enroll foreign students and participate in exchange programs are granted  
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by the Secretary of State. Congress also mandated a reporting requirement from the 
Attorney General to the legislature on the total number of absconders on a yearly basis in 
Section 605.75 
D. THE REAL ID ACT 
The REAL ID Act added more provisions, based on some of the 
recommendations of the 9/11 Commission, to counter the threat of terrorists using 
immigration laws. The Act affected asylum procedures, waived laws that impeded the 
construction of barriers at the borders, and further clarified the role of judicial review in 
removal/ deportation hearings. REAL ID also expands the definition of terrorist 
organization and association criteria. Deportation grounds were made the same as 
inadmissibility criteria.76 The main criticisms of the Act concerned the belief that it 
would force a national identification card, and instead the legislature changed the 
language in the Act and only made a nominal effort to establish guidelines for 
identification cards.  
One of the main focuses of the REAL ID Act is to prevent terrorists from using 
asylum procedures to remain in the United States. This was reinforcement to the previous 
1996 Acts making asylum more difficult to obtain. The REAL ID Act makes clear that 
the Attorney General and the Secretary for Homeland Security can grant asylum. It also 
codifies existing regulations and standards. Asylum applicants must show a burden of 
proof that they will be persecuted in their home country based on at least one of the 
following discriminators: race, religion, nationality, political or social opinion.77 The 
applicant must also provide corroborating evidence unless the adjudicator believes that 
individual testimony is sufficient and persuasive. There is significant leeway for the 
adjudicator in making decisions, but there is also no presumption of credibility for the  
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applicant. The REAL ID Act diverges from previous case law in that it allows for any 
inconsistencies to be seen as evidence of lying whereas inconsistencies before were not 
subject to the same scrutiny.  
Another point the REAL ID Act made was the clarification of judicial review in 
removal hearings. The clarification came after concerns by the judiciary over the 
language written in the IIRIRA and the AEDPA. REAL ID provides a list of criteria for 
limited judicial review and expands previous criteria by including claims under the 
Torture Convention. It also states that no court has jurisdiction for habeas review or 
judicial review of a removal order, but it does allow for review under constitutional 
claims or other legal issues. In essence, it states that courts do not get to decide in the 
matters of individual removal hearings, but they do get a voice in making sure that 
removal procedures occur and that any constitutional issues that arise are open for 
review.78  
Other amendments include a stricter interpretation of immigrant support to 
terrorist organizations. Prior to the REAL ID Act, an alien could use ignorance to 
circumvent any links between their material support or solicitation and a terrorist 
organization. The REAL ID established that they must now show a clear and convincing 
case that there was no way they could have known or should have known about ties to 
any such organization. Providing support to a member of a terrorist organization, 
regardless of knowledge of the organization itself, is also included as grounds for 
inadmissibility and deportability. Also subject for deportation is the spouse or child of 
someone determined to be engaged in terrorist activity or associated with a terrorist 
organization if it was within the last five years.  
The individual eligible for deportation due to the provisions concerning 
association with terrorists also have limited relief from deportation from the REAL ID 
Act as well. Membership in a terrorist activity is not only grounds for inadmissibility, but 
also grounds for deportation and ineligibility for asylum. Withholding removal was also 
another relief opportunity that was modified by the REAL ID Act. Aliens are ineligible if 
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the Attorney General determines the applicant is a threat to U.S. security, the community 
or has a suspicion that the individual committed a serious non-political crime outside the 
United States. This provides an avenue to deny criminals or anyone associated with 
criminal organizations relief proceedings in the interest of public safety.79 
Another controversial provision of the REAL ID Act concerns identification card 
guidelines. The Act, “establishes minimum issuance standards for federal recognition 
requiring that before a state can issue a drivers license or photo identification card, a state 
will have to verify with the issuing agency, the issuance, validity and completeness of (1) 
a photo identification documents containing both the individuals full legal name and date 
of birth, (2) date of birth, (3) proof of a Social Security number or verification of the 
individual’s ineligibility for a SSN, and (4) name and address of the individuals principle 
residence.80 Critics oppose the Act due to concerns over the Tenth Amendment and the 
ability of Congress to regulate interstate commerce and the federal government’s ability 
to put restrictions on the Tenth Amendment as well as the implications of the Act on the 
First Amendment including the free exercise of religion in addition to the expectation of 
privacy. The REAL ID Act provides that deportations of noncitizens, regardless of status, 
are lawful if the noncitizens verbalize support for terrorist organizations. Citizens are 
afforded freedom of speech under the First Amendment, but the REAL ID Act establishes 
that noncitizens are not.81  
The REAL ID Act does not force states to comply with the guidelines, but they 
simply suggest there should be minimum guidelines and that following their guidelines 
will improve national security. The REAL ID Act does require that states determine the 
legality of an individual’s request for identification card, only issue temporary 
identification cards for the period an individual is eligible to remain in the United States, 
and set up policies and procedures for the management of identification cards.  
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E.  ENFORCEMENT OF POLICIES 
The federal government fully understands the dependency between counter-terror 
initiatives and the state and local law enforcement community. In efforts to incorporate 
local officials in policing potential terrorist threats, the federal government implemented 
programs that dealt specifically with immigration problems. They identified as potential 
terrorist threats those who gained entry illegally, those who do not appear at removal 
hearings known as absconders, and those who failed to exit on time. Through multiple 
pieces of legislation, the federal government put redundant measures into effect. The 
policy and mandates are however, easier to write into law than they are to enforce. After 
9/11, local governments were more willing to work within federal guidelines despite their 
previous positions. For example, New York City still remains a sanctuary city, but 
implemented its own anti-terrorism unit within the police department. The primary 
method of enforcing federal legislation comes with a dependency on technological 
advances and the interoperability of those systems.  
1. Federal Initiatives 
In 2005, the Secure Border Initiative (SBI) outlined the goal to reduce the national 
security threat from illegal immigrants crossing U.S. borders. The SBI was a wide-
ranging initiative that sought to incorporate all aspects of border control from deterrence 
to removal. The initiative is not one plan, but a group of plans and initiatives with the 
same goals including the Security and Prosperity Partnership (SPP) of North America and 
programs that rely on technological implementation such as the Smart Border Accord 
with Mexico and the Secure Electronic Network for Travelers’ Rapid Inspection 
(SENTRI). The SBI acknowledged that the plan would only work with better 
coordination between all levels of government and the international community. ICE is 
responsible for eliminating the weaknesses in U.S. economic and transportation security. 
In conjunction with the Border Patrol, ICE used the SBI to expedite the removal of “other 
than Mexican” (OTM) illegal aliens to their home countries within 15 days as well as the 
immediate deportation of Mexicans. ICE officers have considerable authority when 
dealing with illegal immigrants detained at the border and their agents are able to make 
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judgment calls that effect the disposition of many Latin Americans seeking entry into the 
United States. The SBI does not only target those at the border, but also within the United 
States while still allowing for legitimate travel and commerce.82 
The SBI incorporates new technology to assist in the monitoring of hundreds of 
miles of open border. The SBI provided for the use of cameras, unmanned aerial vehicles 
(UAVs), and sensors. The widest used technological capability is the U.S. VISIT system, 
which tracks biometrically a visitor’s arrival and departure. This capability allows for the 
identification of those who overstay their visas. This is important in collecting data on the 
illegal population in the country and formulating policy in regards to those numbers. The 
idea is that a fence is not sufficient at deterrence and even with additional agents at the 
border, there is no one solution that can effectively deter and detect illegal border 
crossings. Other low-tech techniques are also utilized, but are labor intensive. These 
include fences, horses, dogs and traditional patrolling.  
The program is designed to be a framework for integrated responses coupled with 
DHS funding of training and joint operations to counter criminal networks. Additionally, 
the DHS implemented a “catch and return” policy instead of a “catch and release” policy 
with the additional integration of all levels of enforcement. The DHS, under the SBI 
framework, also implemented more self-compliance programs for employers. This is to 
ensure that businesses and the government are united in deterring illegal immigration by 
establishing stiff penalties for non-compliance in addition to making it easier for 
employers to identify those that are not eligible for employment in the United States. This 
does not mean that the DHS makes deportation determinations on their own accord. The 
Department of Justice’s Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) still makes the 
final determination on the removability of an alien after the DHS apprehends and detains 
them.83 
One of the major features of the SBI is the National Fugitive Operations Program 
(NFOP), previously known as the Absconder Apprehension Initiative (AAI). This is in 
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addition to another feature of ICE’s enforcement agencies including the Criminal Alien 
Program (CAP). The NFOP targets criminal illegal aliens whereas the CAP targets illegal 
aliens within the prison system. NFOP has received an increasingly prominent role in 
immigration enforcement within the past five years with a budget that has increased from 
$9 million in FY03 to over $218 million in FY08 and is responsible for over 96,000 
apprehensions of illegal immigrants. ICE estimates that there are more than 550,000 
fugitive aliens within the United States. The NFOP was specifically designed to 
apprehend the most dangerous of illegal criminal aliens on a tiered scale providing those 
posing the most danger to the nation and their community at the top of the scale with 
minor infractions or merely illegal status at the bottom of priorities.84 
In 2002, the NFOP was transformed from the Alien Apprehensions Initiative 
(AAI) in order to find those that pose the most risk to the nation and prioritize those who 
“come from countries in which there has been Al Qaeda terrorist presence of activity.” 
The program was also designed to be coordinated with the U.S. Marshals, the FBI and 
local law enforcement.85 The NFOP is conducted by the use of Fugitive Operations 
Teams (FOTs) who are composed of five individuals. The FOTs do not always work with 
local officials as standard operating procedures and only carry administrative warrants. 
This means that FOTs cannot enter into homes without consent, but do have the right to 
questions others as to their immigration status. There are now close to 100 FOT teams 
and successful operations included the apprehension of 2,179 illegal aliens, including 
gang members, in 2006 during Operation Return to Sender.86  
The successes and initial mission of FOTs has been undermined by mandates that 
require quotas on apprehensions. These quotas undermine the essence of why FOTs were 
established initially. Establishing quotas on apprehensions with no regard to the threat 
defeats the purpose. FOTs are more likely to go after easy targets than dangerous ones 
especially if there is a minimum amount of apprehensions they must make each year. For 
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example, the percentage of fugitive aliens that posed a threat to the community or had a 
criminal conviction that were apprehended in 2003 was 32% of total arrests, but only 9% 
in 2007. The quota guideline was issued in 2006.87 Other areas of concern with the use of 
FOTs concerns the safety of the officers in executing administrative warrants, poor 
community relationships, and racial profiling of immigrant groups.  
The federal government also requires the assistance of state and local agencies to 
enforce current laws. In order to gain their assistance, the names of absconders were 
placed in the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) database which, as of March 
2003, is exempt from Privacy Act standards. The NCIC database is used not only by the 
Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI), but also the state and local law enforcement 
agencies as a method of pulling information on potential criminals. Law enforcement 
officials, even in sanctuary cities, are required to detain individuals that have warrants in 
the system. However, not all individuals in the NCIC are criminals and some have been 
placed in the system erroneously.  
2. State and Local Initiatives  
The ICE’s 287(g) program, named for the section in the Immigration and 
Naturalization Act authorized under the IIRIRA, provided ICE with the authority to train 
state and local law enforcement officials on how to enforce federal immigration laws. 
The program, although authorized in the 1990s, was not fully engaged until 2002. This 
authority has met with strict resistance and differing legal opinions, however the 
Congress has authorized its use and there have been no judicial rulings countering this. 
The section allows for the use of ICE databases in collecting information on the 
immigration status of individuals and the ability to process them for deportation in the 
absence of ICE agents. Advocates cite the use of the section in apprehending convicted 
gang members involved in the drug trade as well as registered sex offenders in addition to 
following the legislature’s constitutional duty to provide for the “common defense” of the 
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United States.88 The 287(g) program does not differentiate between the ability of police 
officers to detain major criminal offenders versus minor violators, whereas the FOT 
mission was to specifically target first those who pose the most risk. 
The 287(g) program has considerable critics as well who argue that the program 
has harmed public safety by putting local police officers as a cornerstone in the 
enforcement of immigration laws. Advocates of community policing believe that fear of 
deportation reduces the willingness of immigrant communities to report crimes and that 
using local police to enforce immigration laws increases the risk of racial profiling 
violations. For example, a study conducted during the initial phases of the program noted 
that ICE did not focus their efforts on areas with high illegal immigrant crime, but on 
areas with high Latino populations. Comparing violent crime with Latino population 
confirmed that areas with higher than the national average for Latino populations 
received more ICE-deputized local officials than those areas with higher than national 
average crime rates. Another example of the incompatible relationship between civil and 
immigration laws was seen in Arizona. In 2005, the state passed the first international 
state human trafficking statute. However, 500 victims were prosecuted under this statute 
without a single organized crime leader being charged.  
These possibilities for misuse and abuse of the 287(g) statue make communities 
reluctant to participate. Additionally, there is a possibility that depending on the 
community, there may be positive or negative financial ramifications of participating. For 
example, communities that participate in the 287(g) program share the cost of ICE 
enforcement, a federal responsibility. For some areas, the funding may cover their 
operating costs, but in other areas, it causes deficits resulting in increased taxes for their 
residents.89  
In contrast to the 287(g), “Sanctuary Cities” allow for state and local law 
enforcement to ignore federal mandates dictated by the IIRIRA. However, the term 
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“sanctuary city” is not as accurately portrayed in the media as most communities in 
essence practice it. The policy is closely aligned with community policing efforts in 
which states and localities develop rules concerning the investigation of one’s 
immigration status for that sole purpose. A “don’t ask, don’t tell” model does not 
specifically advocate violating federal laws, but does enable communities to focus on 
criminal matters and not solely civil immigration violations. It is more of a manner of 
working around the issue. Undocumented aliens are likely to be minorities and therefore 
law enforcement officials have the extra burden of investigating immigration status 
without using racial profiling.90 A policy of non-inquiry into immigration status makes 
the abuses of racial profiling less likely. This does not mean that police officers cannot 
arrest and detain anyone that is suspected of committing a crime, it is their duty to do so. 
However, community policing does have a benefit in establishing trust in communities to 
report crime. 
Illustrating the lack of trust that immigrant communities have in reporting crimes 
is the case of Danny Sigui, a Guatemalan immigrant who provided testimony resulting in 
the conviction of a murderer. At the end of the trial, Mr. Sigui (an undocumented 
immigrant) was deported back to home country by DHS after his status was revealed by 
the state attorney general’s office. He was asked if he would provide testimony again 
knowing he would be deported, and he responded negatively.91 Many advocates of 
community policing cite this as an example that victims and witnesses are crippled by 
programs that are designed to enforce civil immigration law with little regard to benefits 
of community policing initiatives, and criminals are given incentives to prey on 
immigrant communities.  
Los Angeles is one city in which community policing takes priority over federal 
civil immigration laws. Los Angeles passed Special Order 40 in 1979 in which police 
officers cannot ask the immigration status of those not suspected of crimes. Los Angeles, 
a city with a large immigrant population, believes that the general safety of the public is 
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best served by the ability of undocumented aliens to report crimes. This is especially true 
since many immigrant families consist of a combination of the undocumented, legal 
permanent residents and U.S. citizens.92 Federal legislation to sanction police 
departments that fail to enforce civil immigration laws directly affects their ability to 
provide for the overall public safety of communities and is against the nation’s founding 
federal principles. Sanctuary Cities do not provide safe havens for criminal aliens if 
police departments enforce criminal statutes and are properly executing their role to 
provide for the safety of all in the community.  
D.  ANALYSIS OF POLICY CHANGES 
This section describes the main political factors that led to the passage of the 
PATRIOT ACT, the Homeland Security Act, the Enhanced Border Security and Visa 
Reform Act, and the REAL ID Act. Additionally, it describes the political pressure that 
resulted in a new strategy, the SBI, to combat terrorism and criminal activity and explains 
why anti-immigrant sentiment has been directed at Latin America. The terrorist attacks 
provided a spotlight on the flaws in the U.S. immigration system in addition to the flaws 
in the U.S. intelligence and security program. The overwhelming sense of fear and 
uncertainty paralyzed the public as the nation’s leadership searched for targets. Although 
the United States embarked on a prolonged “War on Terror”, the legislative and 
executive branches of government also needed to reform the flawed systems within the 
United States.  
1.  Driving Factors 
There is little doubt that the Acts relating to the increased ability of the federal 
government to combat terrorism was a direct result of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The 
government did not have to look too far when writing legislation in response to 9/11. 
Similar to the 1996 Acts involving counterterror legislation, the immigration system was 
again the prime target.  In essence the policies put forth by the Act post 9/11 were 
measures that expanded and strengthening the current legislation, specifically the IIRIRA 
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and the AEDPA. There were some differences, but the majority of those differences were 
in mandating studies on the effectiveness and feasibility of new programs and utilizing 
new technology, specifically biometrics, to achieve the goals outlined in the previous 
versions of the IIRIRA and the AEDPA. Additionally, the 9/11 Commission was 
resourced in order to find how the United States could have been better prepared in order 
to offer solutions for future security measures.  
The PATRIOT Act has received the most criticism, but passed easily through 
both houses in Congress in 2002. In 2005, the Act was reauthorized and in 2006 more 
substantial changes were made under the USA PATRIOT ACT Reauthorizing 
Amendments Act. The majority of these changes concerned more oversight in wiretaps. 
The basic language of the Act remained especially in the area of deportation.  The Act 
allowed for the detention of noncitizens in order to combat terrorism, but again 
provisions for detention were already set forth by the IIRIRA in 1996. After 9/11, the 
PATRIOT Act along with the IIRIRA allowed for the legal extension of “administrative” 
or “preventative” detention of thousands of deportable immigrants.93  
The Homeland Security Act was the implementation of necessary reforms within 
the INS. Although the reorganization was planned prior to 9/11, there was little political 
pressure until 2001 to actually move forward with a decision. Previously, there were 
problems with balancing services over the transition that may result in some individuals 
being deported due to administrative problems holding up their paperwork. After 2001, 
these concerns were largely dismissed. The new concern was to balance services with 
security.94 The Homeland Security Act also provided the President with the ability to 
change the DHS without any additional statutory amendments.95 This ability was used to 
create two functional divisions that included border functions in one and interior 
enforcement functions in the other. The change went into effect through presidential 
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mandate. A similar reorganization had previously been identified as being needed, but 
stalled for over fifty years due to pressure from union groups, politicians and agency 
infighting.96 
The circumstances surrounding the 9/11 attacks demonstrate more association 
with foreigners than the previous Acts citing political pressure after the Oklahoma City 
bombing, an act of domestic terrorism. Since evidence showed that the majority of the 
terrorists entered the country legally, but remained past their authorization dates, more 
studies were funded to show how visa overstays and fraudulent entrance documents could 
be avoided. The evidence of visa overstays also demonstrated how foreigners needed to 
be tracked properly in order to deport those who remained in the country illegally. 
Deportation could be an effective tool to fight terrorists if those eligible for deportation 
could be identified, detained and deported. The major targets for increased detention and 
public animosity came from the Muslim community due to the association of their 
religion with Al Qaeda. However, as time passed, other immigrant groups felt increasing 
pressure as well.  
As the initial shock of the 2001 terrorist acts faded from memory, new economic 
considerations have taken center stage in forming the opinions of citizens. The United 
States has lost a considerable amount of jobs to outsourcing and U.S. sentiment has 
associated globalization, and the threats of losing more jobs, with the problems of illegal 
immigration. Fighting illegal immigration, in the wake of 9/11 and globalization, has 
become a popular platform of politicians at every level of government. The easy targets 
were Latin Americans, especially Mexicans due to their higher levels of migration to the 
United States and proximity. In order to provide evidence of the damaging effect of 
illegal immigration, criminal activity, gang violence and vulnerability to terrorist 
organizations are all cited. The problem in this philosophy is that immigrants commit 
considerably fewer crimes than citizens and the majority provides a valuable economic 
advantage to the United States’ capitalistic markets in the form of cheap labor for 
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unskilled jobs.97 Although former President George W. Bush advocated an expanded 
temporary worker program, he lacked support in the legislature to further his ideas. 
2.  Consequences 
The Acts post 9/11 have been more successful than the 1996 Acts due to the 
increased levels of metrics and the expanded power of the government. Because of the 
expanded authority granted to the executive by the legislative branch, many critics 
express concern that the Acts were an overreaching of the executive branch with the 
acquiescence of the legislature; powers, once delegated, are difficult to withdraw. For 
example, an executive policy right after 9/11 allowed for INS district directors to 
“overrule release decisions by immigration judges.” This allows for one branch of 
government to effectively control the other thereby eliminating the checks and balance 
built in to our democracy.98 Although Acts with sunset provisions receive more debate 
through the media and in Congress than before, they still pass. There have been some 
minor revisions and policies emplaced, such as more oversight required for wiretaps , but 
no Act has been entirely repealed because they attempt to do what they were written to 
do: effectively secure the United States from foreign threats. These threats were initially 
considered to come from terrorists, but the language in the Acts also made conditions so 
they could be applied to criminal activity.  
Detention and deportation was considered an important tool for preventing 
terrorism, but may offer a false sense of security. In 2002, the United States deported 
almost 115,000 individuals. This was the largest number of deportations in U.S. history, 
but only accounted for a small number of the total undocumented immigrants residing in 
the United States.99 Deportation cannot be considered an effective counterterrorism tool 
if it cannot successfully deport a considerable amount of illegal immigrants.  
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Even the Homeland Security Act that created the DHS and dissolved the INS has 
experienced some contradictory evidence on their role in safeguarding the nation from 
security threats. Despite expanded executive authority and increased funding, the DHS 
has resorted to using more traditional criminal statutes when prosecuting suspected 
terrorists on order to fulfill a preemptive interdiction role instead of prosecuting terrorists 
after an attack occurs. In 2006, approximately 59% of all cases referred to prosecutors on 
international terrorism charges were not prosecuted for various reasons including 
evidence issues.100 Studies also showed that prosecutions for international terrorism cases 
fell in 2006 by 52% from 2001, and sentences were reduced from an average of over 
three years pre-9/11 to 28 days in the first two years after 9/11.  Cases involving domestic 
terrorism were prosecuted at levels two times as high compared to international terrorism. 
For the DHS and the Department of Justice, which received $3.6 billion in FY06 for 
efforts to fight terrorism, this does not appear to be money well spent.101  
The consequences of the REAL ID Act have not been fully examined since there 
have been many delays and debates concerning its implementation. Similarly, the 
EBSVRA has had some serious implementation issues especially concerning the 
construction of physical barriers. Although studies have shown that areas where fencing 
has been erected has decreased the number of apprehensions at the border, the odds of 
being apprehended in general attempting a border crossing as decreased from 33% in the 
1970s and 1980s to just 5% in 2002.102 Migrants have absorbed substantially increased 
risks associated with border crossings including exploitation from criminal groups 
providing transportation as well as harsher environmental conditions resulting from 
moving their crossing to isolated areas of the border. The loss of life and the increase in 
criminal opportunity from barrier projects has been an unintended consequence of the 
legislation.  
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In the area of enforcement, the post 9/11 Acts provided additional funding and 
research capability, but putting the actual recommended courses of action into effect has 
proven extremely difficult. For example, the Migration Policy Institute conducted a 
sixteen- month study along the Southwest border. The study found that approximately 
42,000 individuals from nations other than Mexico were caught at the border attempting 
to gain entry into the United States. Only 14,000 of those were detained to wait for their 
deportation hearing while the remainder received notices to appear. Of those who 
received noticed, only 10% showed. Although expanded programs include expedited 
deportations, the problems lies in the availability of detention beds resulting in the use of 
honor systems.103 In 2007, ICE was found to have had limited training and supervisory 
guidance for immigration officers for “cases involving humanitarian issues and cases 
involving aliens who are not targets of ICE investigations.”104 The problems annotated in 
the study provided fuel for interest groups who believe that ICE officials exercise too 
much discretionary ability and can abuse their authority. 
The policies in the 1990s and the expansion of those policies after 9/11 have 
increased U.S. bureaucracy and demonstrate a commitment to keep the nation safe from 
terrorism as well as crime. However, all available analyses show that there is substantial 
room for improvement in all areas of the immigration system. In particular, deportation 
policy is applied too broadly and more consideration should be given to those who have 
families that are U.S. citizens, have gainful employment, and do not commit violent 
crimes.  Additionally, the Acts and orders over the last thirteen years have raised question 
as to the openness of a nation founded by immigrants on individual rights. The new 
Obama administration pledged greater transparency in government and scrutiny when 
analyzing post 9/11 Acts and executive orders. First, he will have to navigate the  
substantial concerns and challenges from Latin America that have arisen over the past 
decade as a result of conflicting priorities and contradictory policies, not the least of 
which is U.S. immigration policy.  
                                                 
103 Gary Fields, “Security Programs to Speed Action on Illegal Aliens,” The Wall Street Journal, New 
York, NY (August 11, 2004): B3.  
104 Government Accountability Office. “Immigration Enforcement: ICE Could Improve Controls to 
Help Guide Alien Removal Decision Making”  (October 2007): 40. 
 
 56
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 57
IV. EFFECTS OF DEPORTATION POLICY ON NATIONAL 
SECURITY OBJECTIVES 
Deportation is designed to keep America safer from non-citizens who violate US 
laws and pose a significant threat to the country. Prior to and after 9/11, terrorist threats 
and crime have been cited as the primary reasons to increase deportations. The changes to 
immigration law sparked a debate between human and civil rights versus national 
security and what actually constitutes a threat. Despite multiple amendments and new 
legislation, there is not enough that successfully bridges the gap between immigration 
policy and national security.105 In 1996, the United States acted in unprecedented ways to 
restrict immigrant rights in deference to national security under the AEDPA and the 
IIRIRA, but the 9/11 Commission found that immigration authorities were not focused on 
terrorism prior to 9/11.106  The measures outlined by the AEDPA and IIRIRA were 
further intensified after the World Trade Center attacks in 2001 to protect the United 
States from terrorism, but the “all hazards” approach also tended to neglect the initial 
counterterrorism goals and entered into a new era of enforcement using counterterror 
provisions for broad applications in order to fight crime which had always been included 
in previous legislation to respond to crime committed by foreigners.  The Latin American 
community through increased deportations has felt the effects profoundly. Undocumented 
Latin Americans in the United States may represent a security threat, but it is not 
necessarily in the form of terrorism. 
The widespread use of these provisions sent contradicting signals and created 
unintended consequences for Latin American nations who are closely linked to the 
United States economically and socially. The objective of deterring terrorist threats and 
the associated enforcement mechanisms for achieving those goals has increased 
deportations in general, but Latin Americans constitute the majority of all those deported. 
Mexicans make up the largest group at 65% with Honduras and Guatemala at 9% and 
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8%.107 The increased use of deportations as a counterterror strategy not only affects 
national security, but also international relations with Latin America. The side effects of 
deportation policies have had a negative impact on US relations with Latin America, 
undermining the regional assistance and cooperation needed to establish secure borders 
and reduce opportunities for terrorist networks to penetrate the Western hemisphere.    
This chapter describes the threat posed by terrorism and crime in Latin America 
and evaluates the impact of U.S. deportation policy on this threat. Additionally, the 
policies and initiatives put forth since 1996 will also be analyzed to demonstrate their 
impact on U.S. and Latin American relations.  
A. TERRORISM AND CRIME 
 Latin America is not without terrorist organizations and in fact many countries 
have a long history with their own internal struggles against subversive groups designed 
to undermine the government and terrorize the people.  However, terrorist organizations 
within Latin America have maintained more of a domestic approach by either targeting 
their own government or attacking embassies of foreign governments located within their 
own country. On the other hand, criminal organizations have been able to operate without 
national boundaries and may pose a more significant security risk than that of Latin 
American terrorist groups. The following is a brief description of the terrorist and 
criminal threats located or operating within Latin America.  
 In Peru, a university professor named Abimael Guzmán Reynoso founded 
Sendero Luminoso (or Shining Path). Sendero Luminoso’s ideology was rooted in Maoist 
principles and carried out some of the most brutal attacks in history against the 
indigenous population. The ideas of establishing a type of indigenous communism were 
popular in the Ayacucho region of Peru, where inhospitable terrain and lack of education 
limited opportunity. The economic and social conditions were ideal for a terrorist 
network to gain momentum and support in Peru’s poor rural and poor urban 
communities. Sendero Luminoso was a ruthless terrorist organization that terrorized the 
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people. The brutal nature of the organization set into motion a path for a self-coup by 
Peru’s elected leader, Alberto Fujimori to not only crush the insurgency but also 
implement economic reforms with the hopes of reducing the economic factors that 
contributed to the insurgency. Battles between the government and Sendero Luminoso 
frequently inflicted hardship and terror on the innocent population caught in the crossfire 
of the two groups.108 Sendero Luminoso is now only capable of carrying out small-scale 
attacks on military convoys or police.109 The ideology of Sendero Luminoso and their 
small operational framework make the organization an unlikely ally of radical Islamic 
terrorist groups or a major threat to U.S. national security interests. 
 Although Sendero Luminoso poses no significant threats to the United States, 
other Latin American terrorist organizations have demonstrated the capacity to 
undermine U.S. security objectives.  Narcoterrorism – a term first coined in Colombia in 
the 1980s to refer to terrorist actions carried out by drug traffickers in an effort to avoid 
extradition, the term – is today applied to any group that engages in narcotrafficking and 
terrorist acts.  Groups such as the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias Colombianas 
(FARC) and Ejercito de Liberación Nacional (ELN) in Colombia all have been labeled as 
narcoterrorists. Additionally, the right-winged terrorist group formed to fight the FARC 
and ELN, the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC), was engaged in drug 
trafficking before it demobilized. 
 Both FARC and ELN engage in murder of government officials, drug trafficking 
and kidnapping. U.S. citizens were even held hostage by the FARC for over five years. 
Colombian borders do not bind the FARC and ELN. They often violate the sovereignty 
of Colombia’s neighbors –  Ecuador and Venezuela are accused as being used for rest and 
resupply –  sparking international incidents when Colombia pursues the organization.110 
The inability of the region to solve the FARC problem at the strategic level hinders 
efforts at the operational and tactical levels. The failure of the region to join together to 
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counter the effects of the guerrilla groups have led to increased U.S. influence and 
assistance to Colombia to defeat narcoterrorists and support democracy in the region. 
Organizations like the FARC and ELN are contributing factors for increased prison 
populations, an influx of refugees seeking to avoid violence, increased military 
involvement in communities, and an increased reliance on the United States for financial 
aid. There are also conflicting reports on the sympathy and cooperation of other Latin 
American countries with the FARC, undermining Colombia and U.S. efforts to eliminate 
narcoterrorists.111  
 Despite suspicion that Latin American governments are sympathetic to terrorists, 
the only country in Latin America considered by the United States as a state sponsor of 
terrorism is Cuba. This is partly due to the lack of definitive proof of any ties, other than 
diplomatic, between other nations and state sponsors of terror. Additionally, Latin 
American terrorist organizations are different than those that actively act out on their 
anti-U.S. positions such as Al Qaeda. Cuba, however, has been on the list since 1982 
along with Iran, Sudan and Syria due to its involvement with revolutionary movements in 
Africa in addition to other countries in Latin America. Accusations against Cuba for their 
involvement in terrorist activities includes: harboring members of the FARC, ELN, and 
Basque ETA, establishing close relationships with Syria and Iran and accepting U.S. 
fugitives from justice. In 2006, Cuban officials said they would no longer accommodate 
U.S. fugitives. Although countries such as North Korea and Libya have been removed 
from the list, Cuba still remains.112  
 Venezuela remains a country that does not support antiterrorism efforts, but it is 
not on the list of state sponsors of terrorism. The Venezuelan president, Hugo Chávez, 
has been critical of U.S. policies concerning counterterrorism and has strengthened 
economic and diplomatic relations with Iran and Cuba. In 2008, the U.S. Treasury froze 
the U.S. assets of a number of Venezuelan citizens for giving support to Hezbollah. The 
Venezuelan leader is also sympathetic to the ideologies of the FARC and ELN and the 
government is inefficient due to high levels of corruption. Venezuela’s corruption 
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threatens U.S. interests since the ease with which one can obtain citizenship and travel 
documents make it a potential infiltration avenue for U.S.-bound terrorists. The United 
States did levy an arms embargo on Venezuela that was validated after evidence was 
found during a raid on a FARC camp in Ecuador that Hugo Chávez’s administration had 
provided financial support to the FARC. The provisions of the arms embargo prevent the 
sale of all weapons sales and re-transfer of U.S. commercial arms.113   
 Applying a broad counterterrorist policy that disproportionately targets Latin 
American immigrants is a complex and contradictory policy. While Latin America is not 
without terrorists and in fact has a long history of political violence, the leading terrorist 
organizations in Latin America are not actively targeting the United States. Instead, 
groups like the FARC and ELN are focused on their own nations and expanding their 
influence through establishing criminal businesses to fund their operations. While these 
organizations do not share the same ideology as Al Qaeda, there is a possibility they 
might cooperate with other terrorist organizations if it is profitable enough.  Others 
discount this possibility since such an alliance would renew U.S. support for an offensive 
against them at a moment when U.S. interest in Colombia is declining.  
 There is also little that links Latin America to Al Qaeda, the largest terrorist threat 
to the United States. Approximately 6 million Muslims live in Latin America but the only 
significant terror ties to those immigrant communities are believed to exist in the Tri-
border Area (TBA) of Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay. The TBA is considered an 
ungoverned space and an area with considerable criminal activity in addition to a large 
Muslim population that retains ties to their native countries in addition to Islamist 
organizations. The TBA has been associated with terrorist networks that target the United 
States such as Hezbollah and use the area to finance terrorist operations through criminal 
activities. An estimated $500 million has been sent to fund terrorist organizations in the 
Middle East from the profits earned in the TBA.114 Hezbollah is known to be active in 
the TBA in addition to having cells in Colombia, Venezuela, Guyana and Ecuador. 
Although terrorist organizations of all ideologies are known to exist in Latin America, 
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there does not appear to be a significant amount of assistance or pressure to the 
governments that make up the TBA. In fact, the governments of Argentina, Brazil and 
Paraguay deny that any terrorist organization operate, outside financial support networks, 
within the TBA.115 Brazil denies any terrorist organizations exist at all in their country.   
 There is a substantial criminal network that exists throughout Latin America. The 
connection between the drug trade and terrorism poses a particular challenge for the 
United States.  Nineteen of forty-three terrorist organizations worldwide are linked to the 
drug trade. Over half of terrorist organizations are suspected of some sort of illegal drug 
trade connection.116 Even those terrorist groups with strong ideologies against drugs will 
deviate from their strict ideology to support their military operations.   
 Latin American countries may have only loose ties with the Islamic terrorist 
threats commonly cited as the most significant against the United States, but they do pose 
other security risks. The bigger threat from Latin America involving U.S. national 
security is the growing and sophisticated nature of transnational criminal organizations 
and gangs. These organizations cross international boundaries and traffic in weapons, 
humans, drugs and other illegal commodities. They pose a significant threat to not only 
U.S. security interests by their ability to violate the sovereignty of the United States by 
establishing smuggling operations that enter the United States, but also by the goods they 
traffic. Whether drugs or humans, their ability to circumvent the border measures applied 
after years and billions of dollars demonstrates their level of complexity and represent a 
possible avenue of exploitation for terrorist organizations. They contribute to a growing 
dependence on illegal activity for economic survival reducing overall economic 
prosperity within the hemisphere.  
 Hybrid organizations are not the only threat. There are other traditional 
organizations, like criminal organizations, that destabilize government institutions, and 
also provide possible alternative avenues for terrorist organizations to exploit if 
necessary.  Organized crime and gang activity have become increasingly more dangerous 
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over the past thirty years. Increased income disparity in developing nations and 
globalization has contributed to the increased sophistication and networking of criminal 
groups involved in activities ranging from trafficking in drugs, weapons, and persons to 
kidnapping and immigration fraud. Unlike terrorist organizations, criminal organizations 
do not operate under an ideological agenda, but instead take advantage of regional 
conflicts in order to capitalize on opportunities for greater financial benefits.117 Drug 
traffickers in Latin America are able to buy off government officials, as institutions are 
generally weak and incapable of fully eradicating the criminal organizations.  
 Due to the close geographic proximity of Mexico and their highly publicized 
problems with drug cartels, the United States is even more focused on enforcing Mexican 
immigration violations and building better barrier mechanisms at the border. Mexican 
drug cartels have grown in strength and complexity. Mexican drug traffickers smuggle in 
illicit narcotics from other Latin American nations into the United States. In the 1980s 
and early 1990s, Colombia provided the cocaine to Mexican smugglers who brought the 
cocaine across the border and delivered it to Colombian traffickers, but now Mexican 
drug cartels control exchanges from within U.S. cities. Almost half of the cocaine in the 
United States is believed to be from Colombia, but Mexican traffickers are expanding 
their operations by going directly to the growing sources of narcotics in Bolivia and Peru. 
Mexican cartels also have demonstrated influence in the Mexican government due to 
corruption. Not only are Mexican law enforcement officials corrupt, but there is also 
increasing evidence of corrupt U.S. agents at the border.118 
 There is also evidence that link U.S. based street gangs such as MS-13 and the 
18th Street to criminal networks in Central America and Mexico. While street gangs do 
not appear to have evolved into a highly centralized and organized criminal organization, 
the potential exists for them to do so. Both MS-13 and the 18th Street gang are known to 
operate in Washington, D.C, Maryland, Tennessee, New York, Texas and California. 
MS-13 has an estimated 30,000 members and the 18th Street gang is said to have up to 
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10,000. Former guerrillas and soldiers from El Salvador started MS-13 in the 1980s 
during a brutal civil war in their country. Mexicans founded the 18th Street gang during 
the 1960s in Los Angeles in self-defense against other preexisting gangs. The 18th Street 
gang is multi-racial and multi-ethnic resulting in their higher numbers in membership.  
 The 18th Street and MS-13 gangs are threatening since they show signs of 
evolving. Street gangs are defined in generational terms from first to third generations. 
Each generation progresses to a more complex and networked organization. First 
generation gangs are characterized by participating in crimes of opportunities and focus 
on one specific area. Second generation gangs are more business focused and have tighter 
leadership structures. Finally, third generation gangs have more financially and politically 
motivated goals and are able to operate globally. Like terrorist organizations, third 
generation gangs are capable of transcending borders. The 18th Street and MS-13 gangs 
demonstrate the potential to operate as a third generation gang which is why they pose 
such a significant threat to the United States and are a source of possible concern of 
future terrorist infiltration or manipulation although this would be a long-term 
concern.119  
B. LINKS BETWEEN U.S. DEPORTATION POLICY AND TERRORISM 
AND CRIME 
U.S. foreign policy toward Latin America after 9/11 changed dramatically from 
the ideas presented early in the Bush administration. The increased pressure to 
demonstrate U.S. sovereignty and capacity to protect the borders of the United States put 
forth new legislation that increased funding for the newly created Department of 
Homeland Security as well as to create and finish fencing projects along the southern 
border and reduce temporary work visas. U.S. leaders also recognized that security along 
the shared border with Mexico was a joint responsibility, but the two countries appear to 
look at the issue from different perspectives. The United States looks at border issues 
through a security lens and the Mexican government looks at migration through an 
economic one.  
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With the prosperity of the U.S. economy, there seemed to be an emerging 
consensus that undocumented workers were filling jobs not wanted by higher educated 
U.S. citizens thereby adding to revenues and performing a valuable service within the 
U.S. economy. As cheap labor came into the United States, lobbyists worked for the 
reunification of immigrant families and civil rights organizations maintained that 
undocumented and immigrant groups should be afforded the same constitutional 
protections enjoyed by U.S. citizens. Before the 2001 terrorist attacks, a more open 
relationship with Mexico seemed to becoming to fruition with support from a variety of 
lobby groups.120 However, after September 11, 2001, the entire agenda with Mexico and 
a more integrated region came to a drastic halt. The U.S. economy weakened and the 
implications of terrorists on U.S. soil caused perception to shift to more isolation from 
foreign threats, both economic and security related.  
U.S. citizens concluded that it was too easy to enter the United States and that the 
government was not doing enough to protect its citizens. The potential for another 
amnesty bill was replaced by an increase in scrutiny of applications of immigrants and 
the need to better control the borders and interior of the border. Immigration topics 
became more of a priority than drugs and the focus on tougher border measures to fight 
terrorism focused on Mexico even though more terrorists were known to have entered the 
United States through Canada than Mexico (and Canada housed larger numbers of 
immigrants from countries with terrorist ties).   However, the large number of smuggling 
routes crisscrossing the U.S.-Mexico border created the fear that terrorists or weapons of 
mass destruction could be brought across the southern border.121 Early news reports after 
9/11 mentioned an Iraqi-born Mexican citizen, George Tajirian, who was involved in an 
extensive human smuggling ring that is believed to have brought in over 130 
undocumented immigrants to the United States from Middle Eastern nations. Some of the 
individuals were wanted for genocide and other violent crimes in their home nation as 
well as in Europe.  His motivation appeared to be purely financial as he charged extra for 
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those he knew had criminal pasts.122 Evidence of smuggling from Mexico of individuals 
from outside Latin America only gave advocates for stricter border control more 
ammunition when Mexico was trying to increase student visas and greater protections for 
undocumented workers.  While shutting down smuggling routes of criminal organizations 
may prevent infiltration of terrorist organizations, there can be unintended consequences. 
As barrier measures increase, the ingenuity of criminal organizations has proven 
successful in circumventing those tools. This may make it even more difficult to track 
smuggling rings, furthering increasing their effectiveness and appeal to terrorist 
networks.  
 Gang-specific deportation legislation was adopted late in the 1980s and 
underwent significant modifications during the 1990s. The Violent Crime Control and 
Law Enforcement Act of 1994, in addition to the IIRIRA and AEDPA, sought to address 
gang violence on some level. It streamlined the deportation process by adding to list of 
deportation criteria in relation to felony activity. Additionally, Congress funded programs 
for local communities to help establish gang prevention and intervention strategies. 
Various agencies under the Department of Justice counter gang violence. Due to their 
involvement with the drug trade and use of weapons to carry out crimes, gangs face the 
FBI, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, 
Firearms, and Explosives (ATF). The U.S. Attorney’s Office Criminal Division handles 
gang prosecutions and has their own task force devoted solely to the prosecution of 
gangs.  
After 9/11, the FBI focused their investigative efforts on terrorism by shifting 
agents from gang investigations to investigating terrorist organizations. Despite this, gang 
task forces opened more investigations after the reduction in personnel than before the 
shift. During the same time, the FBI did establish a national task force to integrate 
federal, state and local enforcement agencies that may account for the increase despite 
reduction in federal personnel. The task force also cooperates with Central American  
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nations through the development of the Central American Fingerprint Exploitation 
(CAFÉ) Initiative, which consolidates Central American criminal records with the FBI 
fingerprint database.123 
 Other initiatives include the Safe Streets and Violent Crimes Initiative (SSVCI), 
the establishment of the National Gang Intelligence Center (NGIC), the Regional Area 
Gang Enforcement (RAGE) Task Force, the Gang Targeting Enforcement Coordinating 
Center (Gang TECC), and international cooperative initiatives. The SSVCI adapted the 
same techniques used to fight organized crime and applied it to investigating gangs. It 
also integrates investigative procedures between the federal and local levels through the 
implementation of a FBI led specialized task force that oversees 139 subordinate task 
forces.124 The NGIC is the intelligence coordination aspect of the FBI’s efforts. The ATF 
also tracks gang violence by tracing firearms through the National Tracing Center (NTC) 
and regional tracking centers in areas with increased gang violence. 
 In 2005, Operation Community Shield was implemented specifically to address 
MS-13 but expanded to include other violent street gangs nationwide. MS-13 was 
targeted initially due to their involvement in drug and human smuggling, murder and 
kidnapping. Operation Community Shield resulted in a total of 11,106 arrests of gang 
members including 7,109 administrative immigration arrests from its inception through 
Operation ICE Surge in 2008.125 Operation Community Shield officials reported that 80 
percent of the aliens arrested had committed a serious crime and 40 percent had violent 
criminal histories and therefore arrests were not solely based on immigration 
violations.126 However, the way Operation Community Shield worked was based on 
using immigration laws to detain and deport criminal undocumented aliens. Local law 
enforcement presented information to ICE agents on gangs and gang members in their 
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area. The ICE agents analyze the information to see if there are any immigration 
violations that can be used to arrest the individuals of concern. The tactic takes the gang 
member off the street immediately and serves as a beginning step in future investigations 
into their criminal activity.127  
 Operation Community Shield was a national effort, but states have implemented 
their own anti-gang initiatives. Texas implemented Operation Border Star late in 2007 
and the state legislature put over $110 million dollars into collaborative efforts to respond 
to crime, drug smuggling and terrorism. However, initiatives such as Operation Border 
Star have been met with considerable opposition based on the measures used to evaluate 
the operation’s effectiveness. The overall goal of the program was to reduce crime at the 
Texas border and thereby increase the safety of the entire state. However, in attempting to 
show progress and the state legislature exerting control over enforcement capability 
without focusing specifically on criminal activity, Operation Border Star pours millions 
of dollars into measuring normal police work. A report conducted by the American Civil 
Liberties Union of Texas found that there were ineffective performance measures due to 
the performance standards mandated with no association to the context in which arrests 
are actually made. In addition, the reporting procedures for local law enforcement to 
report to the Joint Operations Intelligence Center (JOIC) make analysis difficult since 
even minor arrests are reported to show progress and compliance. In fact, the most 
reported performance measure sent to the JOIC is a call for service. A call for service 
does not help measure the effectiveness of the operation in combating drug dealers or 
human smugglers. Reporting data with no security implications burdens those responsible 
for analysis at the JOIC and wastes manpower and resources.128  
 Transnational gang organizations operate in criminal activity that is punishable 
under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization (RICO) and Violent Crimes in Aid 
of Racketeering (VICAR) statutes.  The increased penalties under legislation passed in 
the aftermath of 9/11 made gangs a legitimate target for not only immigration violations, 
                                                 
127 Vaughan and Feere, 15. 
128 Laura Martin and Rebecca Bernhardt, “Operation Border Star: Wasted Millions and Missed 
Opportunities,” The American Civil Liberties Union of Texas (March 16, 2009): 8. 
 69
but also additional criteria of deportable offenses. Ironically, when prosecutors try to 
enforce RICO and VICAR regulations on normal street gangs, they face substantial 
problems establishing links between the crime and a criminal network, however the more 
a street gang behaves and evolves into an organized criminal network, the better chance 
prosecutors have in enforcing stricter penalties.129 There is conflicting evidence about the 
evolution of street gangs. The Washington Office on Latin American (WOLA) conducted 
a study and provided evidence that MS-13 and the 18th Street gangs were simple street 
gangs, however, law enforcement and immigration officials disagree and have 
successfully implicated and prosecuted gang members in RICO related violations. 
WOLA’s study, conducted over a period of 12 months, concluded that the majority of the 
offenses were “petty theft and neighborhood extortion.”130 WOLA argues that gangs 
have no intent of expanding their operations and thus should not be considered 
racketeering operations. 
 The idea that increased cooperation and integration between law enforcement and 
immigration enforcement is essential in promoting safety and security is not without 
merit. However, priorities and accurate reporting are necessary in order to measure 
success. Operation Border Star is one of the most recent initiatives in Texas, but it does 
not seem to have incorporated many of the lessons learned from previous operations in 
Texas. For example, Operation Linebacker in 2005 increased patrols, checkpoints and 
cameras on the border, but the operation netted seven times more undocumented 
immigrants than criminals.131 Operation Rio Grande in 2006 emplaced cameras along the 
border’s rural areas at a cost of $5 million dollars. The cameras streamed live to a website 
that anyone could access, which they did out of curiosity and not as a community 
policing effort. Additionally, allowing unfettered access to tools designed for security 
provides the same tools to drug cartels and terrorists who can then develop their own 
procedures around U.S. security measures. Operation Wrangler involved 133 police 
departments, 90 sheriff’s offices and Texas National Guard Soldiers in addition to federal 
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agents. The operation accounted for an increase in drug arrests, but also was criticized by 
the Mexican government for racial profiling. The operation was criticized for using racial 
profiling to catch undocumented immigrants for traffic violations rather than 
investigating drug and human smuggling crimes.132 
 Gang members are not the only targets of enforcement measures. Even though the 
largest threats to security are from criminal organizations, the policies of using law 
enforcement to pursue all undocumented workers poses its own limitations and questions. 
For example, statistics show that only illegal immigrants are deported. However, once an 
immigrant is found in violation of any number of civil or criminal codes, they are 
considered illegal and deportable. Additionally, statistics that differentiate between the 
types of crimes committed that warrant deportation and those for which individuals 
remain incarcerated are unavailable, but efforts are improving. As a result of changes in 
immigration laws, there is also a lack of discretion when it comes to deporting an 
individual who has committed minor offenses or civil offenses.133 While border measures 
and immigration reform were politically focused domestically, they had international 
impact.  The security dilemma of the United States had an undeniable impact on relations 
with Latin America. 
C. IMPACT OF DEPORTATIONS ON U.S.-LATIN AMERICAN 
RELATIONS 
 Despite the limited ties with terrorist organizations, Latin Americans have the 
highest rates of deportations. The higher rates are primarily due to the disproportionate 
number of undocumented Latin Americans, especially Mexicans, compared to other 
ethnicities; however if the true threat is terrorism, then why waste resources on the least 
threatening group? The United States is supposed to be targeting terrorist threats, but 
without definitive intelligence, it can be easier to target criminal networks to improve 
security for the public with the use of local law enforcement capabilities to enforce 
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immigration laws. Deportation is an appealing avenue for law enforcement officials. 
Returning criminals and terrorists to their home countries reduces and eliminates the need 
for long detentions for those who may fall into gray areas of the domestic criminal code. 
Relaxing deportation criteria keeps costs of investigations and detention space lower than 
if deportations were the last resort.  However, moving the threat – whether criminal or 
terrorist – can unintentionally create new networks or reinforce the individual’s status 
within an organization.134  
For example, to the extent street gangs in Central America and key U.S. cities are 
becoming more complex and involved in the transnational activity of the drug trade, this 
can be attributed to the deportation of Latin American gang members back to their home 
country since the mid 1990s changes in immigration law. It is argued that deported gang 
members participated in gang activity in their new homes for economic survival or as a 
way to further interests of U.S. based gangs.135 While local youth gangs were present in 
Central America and Mexico before the enactment of the IIRIRA and the AEDPA, these 
were first-generation neighborhood gangs involved in petty crime.  The U.S. deportation 
policy exported U.S. gang culture (which was much more violent that Central American 
gang culture) to Central America along with the deportees; deportees were able to take 
over and consolidate existing organizations and make them far more dangerous (and 
transnational) than they had been before.   
The massive number of deportations within the Western Hemisphere constitutes 
an enormous security challenge for the entire region. Deporting a criminal to their home 
nation does not necessarily protect the United States from further actions from the same 
deported individual. The majority of those deported from the United States are from 
Mexico and Central America. The governments in Latin America are small and not as 
well resourced as the United States. Removing criminal aliens to their home nations may 
not always ensure that those individuals will receive any rehabilitation, incarceration or 
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have reasons to not reenter the United States.136 Not only do governments have 
challenges to reintegrating deportees, but families are also separated for even minor 
violations causing more unintended effects. 
 In addition, efforts are made to deport all undocumented immigrants, which 
undermines the more targeted use of deportation policy. Arguments can be made that 
terrorist and gang members will have jobs not associated with criminal activity in order to 
make a living and that worksite raids and deporting all undocumented workers will prove 
dividends in the long run. However, an encompassing approach has many unintended 
consequences and does not accurately address the problems with the U.S. immigration 
system. The United States has no responsibility to harbor criminal immigrants who 
violate U.S. laws, however the lack of discretion may cost the nation more economically 
and socially than a more targeted deportation policy. The costs are seen not only in the 
impact of deportees to their home nations, but also to U.S. citizens for a variety of 
reasons that are not examined in the cost-benefit analysis of deportations in general.   
 U.S. immigration policy has always been important to Latin America as many 
from the area seek to live in the United States indefinitely or temporary as opportunities 
in the United States are greater than in their home countries. The United States has a long 
history of changing their immigration policies based on domestic politics mainly 
stemming from fluctuations in the economy. Economic factors as well as conflict and 
racial motivations also are important to understand in analyzing U.S. immigration policy. 
These underlying factors result in preferential treatment to immigrants from specific 
countries depending on the time period. For example, in 1882, the Chinese Exclusion Act 
discriminated against Chinese citizens solely on their national origin. The Immigration 
and Nationality Act Amendments of 1965 removed specific quotas that discriminated 
against non-northern Europeans. The removal of restrictions led to more immigrants from 
Africa, the Middle East and Latin America migrating to the United States. The 
amendment and the Civil Rights movement determined that excluding one specific group 
of people based on nationality, education, race or economic status was against the 
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founding principles of the United States and should be avoided. The result was a 
tremendous growth in immigrants in communities; this, in turn, created a backlash among 
some who felt that immigrant groups were burdening federal and state systems as the 
immigrant community grew from 19 million in the 1990s to over 31 million by 2000.137  
 The large influx of immigrants after the 1960s also increased their political power 
through participation in labor unions and calls for more immigration restriction were met 
with calls for amnesty to all undocumented workers. The amount of remittances sent back 
to immigrants’ home countries are essential to Latin American governments, which 
advocate for more opportunities for their citizens to work in the United States. The 
United States had little resources to deal with the enforcement of immigration violation 
for workers and despite the 1996 AEDPA and IIRIRA legislation, there was little that 
was actually done to curb illegal immigration and counter the large influx of immigrants 
into the country. It also appeared that there would be more regional integration after the 
election of George W. Bush who advocated new guest worker programs and free trade 
areas. However, the events of 9/11 demonstrated how ineffectual the 1996 acts were and 
gave political power to groups that wanted to curb immigration. The idea of an open and 
integrated region was sidelined by a demand for increased security at U.S. borders that 
disproportionally affected Latin Americans due to their sheer proximity. 
 The increase in deportable offenses and increased policing efforts targeting 
immigrant communities and grouped nonviolent criminals, undocumented workers and 
gang members into one group despite the recognized need for priorities. One of the 
unintended consequences concerns the impact on families comprised of U.S. citizen 
children and undocumented or criminal immigrant facing deportation. Under the new 
rules, even a long-term legal resident of the United States is subject to deportation if they 
have any conviction relating to a controlled substance or receive a minimum one-year 
sentence for any offense.138 Essentially this means that even someone who came to the 
United States as a child and is a long-term legal resident is deportable for a drug 
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violation. Their entire family may reside in the United States and may not even remember 
their home country or speak the language. Families may also be separated as parents are 
deported from the United States and their U.S. born children remain, causing unnecessary 
hardship on families. Since legislative changes have removed room for discretion in 
applying deportation policy, the amount of cases where the costs of deportation far 
outweigh the benefits have certainly increased.  
 Deportations not only hurt families, but they also reduce remittances to many 
Latin American nations. Remittances to Mexico account for over $20 billion and in 
Central American and the Dominican Republic, remittances surpass foreign investment 
and assistance combined.139 In the United States as well as in Latin America, political 
action groups of immigrants are becoming increasingly important in domestic politics. 
The hemisphere is becoming more regionally integrated through mutual migration and 
transnational economic policies and not solely through criminal transnational networks. 
The strengthening of both criminal and legitimate networks that surpass any border 
makes deportations less effective. The complete integration of the United States and 
Latin America through economic policies and social connections make legislative 
initiatives less effective. The systematic relaxation in offenses that warrant deportation 
has established mixed reactions. The United States has increased their efforts for border 
fences and stricter immigration policies due to the threats of terrorism and perceptions of 
increased immigration crime rates, but the efforts have not resulted in substantial benefits 
for the United States nor helped to strengthen relations with Latin American nations.  
D.  U.S.-LATIN AMERICAN EFFORT TO IMPROVE REGIONAL 
SECURITY 
 The United States had new policy objectives after September 11, 2001, and 
combating terrorism and crime was at the forefront of any initiative. Additionally, the 
National Security Strategy presented in 2002 and 2006, while only briefly mentioning 
Latin America, cited promoting freedom as an inseparable priority for fighting the War 
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on Terror in addition to ending illicit trade (drugs, humans, weapons) as an important 
area to address to strengthen U.S. strategy.140 Security had many different interpretations 
from economic security to preventing violations of immigration regulations and 
terrorism. The United States also reevaluated their foreign policy in regards to Latin 
America as the Cold War enemies disintegrated and a new foreign enemy, Islamist 
terrorists, proved to be more elusive and adaptive. Even though the threat from the 
Middle East was more prevalent and Latin America seemed to be an unlikely ally for 
extreme Islamist terrorists, the U.S. government also attempted to put in place strategies 
that attempted to circumvent anti-American sentiment through humanitarian assistance 
and aid with the full understanding that lack of opportunity and income disparity are 
potential weaknesses for terrorists to infiltrate. Additionally, Latin America had their own 
brand of terrorists and new resources to fight “narcoterrorism.” The United States 
decided to engage Latin America to fight transnational criminal networks, regardless of 
type, to improve U.S. security. For many Latin American countries, the U.S. “War on 
Terror” was inconsistent with pressing items on their agenda.  
 The reaction to 9/11 in the United States also gave Latin America new problems 
to address. Shutting down the southern border and crippling the economies of both the 
United States and Mexico was not a realistic option. Neither was it realistic to round up 
and deport any undocumented immigrant within the United States; however, politicians 
perceived little support for another amnesty program or an increase in temporary guest 
worker programs for Latin Americans despite the financial benefits related to cheap labor 
and the enormous costs associated with mass deportations.141 Latin America, however, 
has joined in some efforts with the United States to show integration with antiterrorism 
and crime efforts that encompass a wide spectrum of operations from supporting counter 
terror efforts to drug trafficking. The United States has shown assistance to Latin 
America by providing additional resources for strengthening democracy and support for 
Latin American countries that receive deportees.  
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 A number of initiatives have been developed to assist nations with the effects of 
deportation. One deals with the initial reception and reintegration of those deported. A 
study conducted on Jamaicans deported from the United States, Canada and the United 
Kindom found that “reintegration efforts could e a cost-effective way for deportee-
sending countries to promote development and weaken international crime networks.”142 
Many Latin American nations have called for more integration and assistance in 
deportation concerns. They have expressed concern over a lack of communication over 
and access to the criminal records of the deportees.143 Many deportees, even those with 
criminal convictions, arrive without the knowledge of their home governments. El 
Salvador and Honduras, nations with high deportation rates, have both signed agreements 
with the United States to implement electronic travel systems. This system would provide 
the information on the person deported to law enforcement in their home countries.144 
The Congress has expressed a willingness to implement more assistance programs, but 
proposals are not currently available. Proposals to stop migration are more popular than 
reintegration programs despite the long-term benefits associated with reintegration 
programs.  
 Whereas assistance to deported individuals is lacking, the United States has 
shown compassion in joining in a bilateral agreement with Mexico to combat human 
smuggling. The Operation Against Smuggling Initiative on Safety and Security 
(OASISS) was started in 2005, but was limited to specific areas around San Diego, 
Yuma, Arizona. It eventually was expanded to conclude El Paso, Texas and Coahuila, 
Mexico. In FY2007, over 660 prosecutions of human smuggling and trafficking were 
preferred with almost half tried in Mexico.145 The U.S. Customs and Border Patrol also 
created “Operation Lifeguard” in the El Paso, Texas area in order to prevent migrant 
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deaths and apprehend smugglers in the area. During FY2007, migrant deaths in the area 
fell 24%.146 However, this statistic is hard to measure without looking to see if there were 
higher casualties in nearby areas.  
 Despite the denouncement of border fences by Mexican officials, the Mexican 
government has participated in cooperative efforts along the border with the United 
States. These efforts have included the sharing of information as well as mutual 
agreements. The “U.S.- Mexico Action Plan for Cooperation and Border Safety for 2004, 
as well as a Memorandum of Understanding on the Safe, Orderly, Dignified and Humane 
Repatriation of Mexican Nationals” was signed in 2004 by DHS Secretary Tom Ridge 
and Mexican Government Secretary Santiago Creel. The agreement was also 
strengthened by the implementation of six new Secure Electronic Network for Traveler’s 
Rapid Inspection (SENTRI) lanes in 2006.147 Even with the new memorandums and 
SENTRI lanes, there is still a large difference in the ease of travel for Mexicans and 
across the Mexican border as compared to that of Canadians and their border. The six-
month travel visa allowed for Canadians whereas no such concessions are provided for 
Mexican citizens can evidence the disproportion. 
 The contradictions in provisions and relative discriminatory treatment of 
undocumented immigrants from Latin America had damaged relations with Latin 
American governments. While the United States has sent positive signals for trade 
integration, the U.S. government has failed to follow through on true regional integration. 
Additionally, the use of deportations has not only been ineffective as a counterterror tool, 
it placed too much emphasis on Latin Americans. The lack of successfully applying 
priorities for terrorism and violent illegal immigrants did not demonstrate a real focus on 
counterterror and overall public safety. 
   
 
  
                                                 
146 Cook, 12.  
147 Cook, 12.  
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V. CONCLUSION 
Keeping the United States safe from terrorism and crime is almost impossible but 
have the changes in immigration policy actually produced any measureable results?  
Increasing enforcement under the guise of counterterror legislation without first 
identifying the underlying reasons for increased enforcement is misleading and 
inaccurate. Undeniably, the events of 9/11 expanded deportation policy, but there is little 
evidence that the increased deportations have yielded any counterterror benefit, 
especially since the majority of those deported are Latin Americans. That does not mean 
that deportation policy has not helped the immediate security needs of the United States 
by deporting criminals. However, by fueling transnational criminal networks, deportation 
policy undermined the long-term security of the United States and key Latin American 
nations.  
The changes to immigration policy after 9/11 are not as drastic as publically 
perceived, but they did seek to reinforce the new objective to deter terrorist attacks.  The 
legislative provisions outlined in the IIRIRA and AEDPA in the 1990s set the precedent 
for a parallel between immigrants and terrorism. The creation of the Department of 
Homeland Security, however, changed the function of those agencies whose previous 
purpose was to facilitate applications. The implementation of the DHS, whose primary 
mission is to secure the nation, changed the organizational culture of immigration 
agencies from assistance to suspicion. The consequences of the pre 9/11 and post 9/11 
acts, such as the Homeland Security Act and the PATRIOT Act may be unintentional, but 
they still affect the disposition of thousand of immigrants who seek a better life in the 
United States and not just terrorist suspects.148 The objective of deporting potential 
terrorists or terrorist supporters is not without merit, however the application of these 
principles does not always apply to Latin Americans and is therefore misused if solely 
using a counterterror defense. 
                                                 
148 Thomas Donovan, “Immigration Policy Changes After 9/11: Some Intended and Unintended 
Consequences,” The Social Policy Journal 4 (1) (2005): 35. 
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 Preventing terrorist attacks is the primary mission of the DHS, but there must be 
metrics to measure success other than the simple absence of successful attack within the 
United States since 2001. The metrics used, when compared to prior to 9/11 statistics, 
offer some contradictions that raise more questions to the true success rate of U.S. tactics. 
For example, 6,400 individuals were prosecuted for terror-related crime within the first 
two years after 9/11. These crimes included minor offenses and only 16 convictions 
resulted in a prison sentence of more than five years, hardly a sentence associated with 
actual terrorism. This evidence suggests that prosecutors are willing to settle for 
convictions of lesser offenses, but that does not make the nation safer in the long run. 
 Logic also leads us to question the value of using deportation as a means to 
counter actual terrorist threats (or even criminal threats). If an individual does threaten 
the United States, losing physical control over that individual is not tactically savvy. The 
expanded authorizations of the PATRIOT Act and FISA would suggest that there are 
more mechanisms for gathering information on foreign threats operating within the 
country than less. Simply deporting the individual fails to truly contain or exploit the 
threat, but detaining individuals without due process indefinitely leads to human rights 
violations concerning rights to liberty and undermines the constitutional principles. There 
is also no evidence that Latin Americans are being targeted based on origins that are 
known to have higher levels of terrorist activity.  
The dynamics along U.S. borders and ports as well as from within the interior of 
the country make the task daunting and unending, but it is still a necessary endeavor. 
Combating crime is essential to national security and focusing on threats from foreign 
enemies is an appropriate strategy. When the strategy and the methods do not match, 
confusion and mistrust are able to cause significant problems that hinder efforts on all 
counts and increase ideological differences. Since there is a disproportionate focus on the 
southern U.S. border with Mexico as opposed to the northern border with Canada, there 
is a tendency to believe that U.S. policies are more culturally motivated.  
The security of the entire hemisphere is dependent on integration and cooperation, 
but conflicting messages over economic and social matters do not encourage positive 
dialogue.  Deportation policies that disproportionately target Latin Americans subvert the 
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basis for cooperation and, more importantly, increase the criminal threat that struggling 
Central American countries are ill equipped to handle. More emphasis on reintegration 
assistance and not just communication on deportees will provide long-term benefits for 
both the United States and Latin American nations whose law enforcement capacity is 
significantly less. Reintegration assistance that is focused on education and rehabilitation 
can help provide individuals with the necessary skills they require to perform jobs in their 
own country as well as make gang life an unattractive option. Latin American nations 
appear willing and eager to join in long-term efforts focused on this strategy, but the 
United States has yet to change course from barriers and drug eradication policies. 
Currently Central American leaders are pushing for inclusion of Guatemala into the 
temporary visa program that El Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua are party to in 
addition to slowing the deportation of their citizens back into the region. 149 
In 2009, the United States has a new chance for increasing the dialogue with Latin 
America. Promises of transparency and international accountability and law resonate with 
Latin America. The Obama administration would be well served by establishing long- 
term strategies and policies that are initiated by Latin American governments and seek to 
benefit both nations and not just the United States. The President should also capitalize 
on his current popularity within Latin America and increase relations with Mexico after 
U.S. Senators criticized the country’s ability to govern certain parts of the Mexican 
country. The Bush administration expressed a desire early, but 9/11 set the country on a 
new path and a focus on positive Latin American relations was lost. A new opportunity 
has emerged and it should be taken quickly and the administration should not lose focus 
on Latin America. 
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